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THE NEW LOOK IN MILITARY JUSTICE
ROBINSON 0. EVERETT*
A recent spate of widely publicized trials by court-martial has fo-
cused national attention on military justice. Some observers have con-
cluded that it is still no more than "drumhead justice"'- and that "mili-
tary justice is to justice as military music is to music."2  A similar ap-
praisal underlies the Supreme Court's majority opinion in the landmark
case of O'Callahan v. Parker,3 where Mr. Justice Douglas alludes to
"so-called military justice," 4 "the travesties of justice perpetrated" un-
der the Uniform Code of Military Justice,5 and the circumstance that
"courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the
subtleties of constitutional law."6
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. A.B. 1947, LL.B. 1950,
Harvard University; LL.M. 1959, Duke University.
1. See generally CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND (J. Finn ed. 1971); R. RIVKNn, G.I.
RIGHTS AND ARMY JUSTICE: THE DRAFTEE'S GUIDE TO MILITARY LIFE AND LAW
(1970); Keefe, Drumhead Justice: A Look at Our Military Courts, READER'S DIG.,
Aug., 1951, at 39; Keefe & Moskin, Codified Military Injustice, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 151
(1949); Walsh, Can the Military Cope with Thirteen Books? 50 A.B.A.J. 67 (1964).
HEREINAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
ARTICLE:
Uniform -Code of Military Justice arts. 1-140, 10 U.S.C. § 801-940 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as U.C.M.J.];
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1969), 34 Fed. Reg.
10,503 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL];
1 REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE IN
THE ARMED FORCES (1972) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT];
U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS, JuDE ADVOCATES GENERAL & GENERAL CoUN-
SEL OF THE DEP'T OF TRANsP., ANNUAL REPORT (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971
ANNUAL REPORT];
Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter cited as
1962 Hearings].
2. See R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE Is TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC Is TO
MUSIC (1969).
3. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). See note 7 infra and accompanying text.
4. Id. at 266 n.7.
5. Id. at 266. Congress originally enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice
in 1950. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1, 64 Stat. 108 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §
801-940 (1958)). This original Code was significantly amended in 1968. Act of
Oct. 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, H9 1-4, 82 Stat. 1335, amending 10 U.S.C. § 801-
940 (1958) (codified at 10 U.S.C. H§ 801-940 (1970)). The U.C.M.J. constitutes
the basic corpus juris of military law for all the armed forces. See notes 11-46 infra
and accompanying text.
6. 395 U.S. at 265.
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The majority's unflattering evaluation of military justice contrib-
uted substantially to its holding in O'Callahan that service personnel
can only be tried by court-martial for "service-connected" offenses.'
Furthermore, if that evaluation remains the same, O'Callahan will
probably be given a very sweeping interpretation, 8 and the scope of
civilian court review of courts-martial will expand.9 Similarly if Con-
gress becomes convinced that military justice is of inferior quality,
drastic legislative changes in the system will be forthcoming.10
This Article suggests, on the other hand, that the case against
military justice has been exaggerated, that important reforms have al-
ready taken place, and that further major changes would be premature
at this time. Indeed, in some respects military justice provides protec-
tions that are not available in civilian tribunals.
RECENT LEGISLATIVE REFORM-THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF 1968
When Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice in
1950,11 it made important reforms and attempted-albeit without
complete success' 2-- to institute the same system of military justice for
7. For discussions of this holding, see Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 356
n.1 (1971) (citing authorities); Blumenfeld, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilian-
Type Crimes, 10 AM. CRIb. L. Rnv. 51 (1971); Everett O'Callahan v. Parker-Mile-
stone or Millstone in Military Justice? 1969 DuKE L.J. 853; Nelson & Westbrook,
Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses. An Analysis of
O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1969); Rice, O'Callahan v. Parker:
Court-Martial Jurisdiction, "Service-Connection," Confusion, and the Serviceman, 51
Mr.rrARy L. REv. 41 (1971).
8. Conversely, a more favorable view of military justice by the Supreme Court
may lead to a narrowing of the scope of the O'Callahan holding. See Everett, supra
note 7.
9. For commentary on civilian court review of courts-martial, see Bishop, Civilian
Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-Martial Convictions, 61
CoLUM. L. REv. 40 (1961); Everett, Collateral Attack on Court-Martial Convictions,
11 Am FoRcE JuDnGE ADvOcATE GENERAL L. REv. 399 (1969); Sherman, Judicial Re-
view of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55
VA. L. REv. 483 (1969); Weckstein, Federal Court Review of Courts-Martial Proceed-
ings: A Delicate Balance of Individual Rights and Military Responsibilities, 54 MILI-
TARY L. Rnv. 1 (1971).
10. As to proposals for legislative changes, see Bayh, The Military Justice Act of
1971: The Need for Legislative Reform, 10 AM. CIM. L. RPv. 9 (1971); Sherman,
Congressional Proposals for Reform of Military Law, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 25
(1971).
11. See note 5 supra.
12. Congress considered that, as to certain matters, the secretaries of the various
military departments should remain free to promulgate their own directives. See, e.g.,
U.C.M.J. arts. 14 (delivery of offenders to civil authorities), 15 (nonjudicial punish-
ment), 58 (execution of confinement), 65 (disposition of certain records of trial),
10 U.S.C. §§ 814-15, 858, 865 (1970). Illustrative of the diversity in policy among
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all the armed services. Among its most significant achievements, the
Uniform Code created an all-civilian Court of Military Appeals to re-
view serious cases,13 provided for the inclusion of legally qualified law
officers in general courts-martial, 14 commanded that legally qualified
counsel be furnished to accused in general courts-martial.' 5 and required
a warning to suspects of their right to remain silent.' 6 Despite not infre-
quent complaints, only minor changes were made in the Code7 until
the armed services are: (1) extensive plea-bargaining in the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps, but a prohibition thereof in the Air Force; (2) use of a trial judiciary in the
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, but not in the Air Force; (3) adjudging of bad con-
duct discharges by special courts-martial in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, but
not in the Army; (4) providing lawyers to defend and prosecute a substantial per-
centage of special courts-martial in the Air Force, but not in the other services. As to
the last three of these four matters, there is now uniformity as a result of the Military
Justice Act of 1968.
13. Id. art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867. The Court of Military Appeals can only review
cases which have been reviewed by a Court of Military Review-until 1969 known as a
Board of Review. Id. art. 67(b), 10 U.S.C. § 867(b). The Courts of Military Re-
view must review trials by court-martial which involve an approved sentence of death,
dismissal, dishonorable or bad conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or
more, and cases in which the sentence, as approved, affects a general or flag officer.
Id. art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866. Also, the Judge Advocate General may refer other rec-
ords of trial by general court-martial to a Court of Military Review. Id. art. 69,
10 U.S.C. § 869.
14. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1 (art. 26), 64 Stat. 117. See notes 21-22
infra and accompanying text. The general court-martial, usually convened for only
the most serious types of offenses, is empowered to adjudge "any punishment not
forbidden by [the Uniform Code], including the penalty of death when specifically
authorized by [the Uniform Code]." U.C.MJ. art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970).
The special court-martial, convened for less serious offenses or for cases where a
summary court-martial has been rejected by the accused, may adjudge sentences in-
cluding bad conduct discharge, confinement of up to six months, and forfeiture of
pay, not exceeding two thirds of monthly pay, for up to six months. Id. art. 19,
10 U.S.C. § 819. The summary court-martial, convened for still lesser offenses or for
cases where nonjudicial punishment has been waived, may impose a sentence of up to
thirty days' confinement at hard labor and partial forfeiture of pay for up to one month.
Id. art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820. Finally, commanding officers are authorized to impose
such disciplinary measures as restriction to base or arrest in quarters under the Uni-
form Code's nonjudicial punishment procedures. Id. art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815.
15. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1 (art. 27), 64 Stat. 117.
16. U.C.M.J. art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1970).
17. Probably the most important change was the expansion in 1962 of a com-
mander's authority to impose nonjudicial punishment under article 15 of the Uniform
Code. Act of Sept. 7, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-648, § 1 (art. 15), 76 Stat. 447. See
also U.C.M.J. art. 58(a), 10 U.S.C. § 858(a) (1970), which provides for certain auto-
matic reductions in enlisted grade upon approval by the convening authority of a sen-
tence including a punitive discharge, confinement, or hard labor without confinement.
Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-633, § 1(1) (art. 58(a)), 74 Stat. 468. In 1961 a
specific punitive article was enacted to prohibit certain worthless check offenses. Act
of Oct. 4, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-385, § 1(1) (art. 123(a)), 75 Stat. 814.
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enactment of the Military Justice Act of 1968.18 This legislation,
which was enacted prior to the O'Callahan decision but which did not
take effect until several months thereafter, 9 resulted chiefly from the
efforts of Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., whose Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Rights had conducted hearings on military justice in 1962 and
1966 and had recommended extensive changes. 20
Perhaps the greatest change accomplished by the Military Justice
Act of 1968 was its creation of the post of military judge. Even prior
to the Uniform Code, Army and Air Force general courts-martial had
a law member, who was legally trained and who alone made rulings of
law during the trial. Additionally, the law member deliberated on
guilt and sentence with the other court members. The Code required
that each general court-martial have a law officer, who was to be an at-
torney certified by the Judge Advocate General of his armed force as
qualified for such duty.2 This law officer sat apart from the court
members, ruled on interlocutory matters, instructed the members of
the court concerning applicable law, but did not join in their delibera-
tions. However, unlike a civilian judge, his rulings on a motion for a
finding of not guilty were not final and could be overturned by the
court members-the jury; nor could he rule finally on challenges for
cause to members of the court-martial.
22
Under the Code there was no requirement that service as law of-
ficer be a primary duty; and often a law officer might serve in that
capacity only a few times each year. Moreover, the law officer might
18. Act of Oct. 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, §§ 1-4, 82 Stat. 1335.
19. The effective date was August 1, 1969, with respect to most of the provisions
of the Act. Id. § 4, 82 Stat. 1343. That passage of the Act had not been
foreseen by the armed services is attested to by their promulgation, earlier in
1968, of a new Manual for Courts-Martial, which almost immediately was
made obsolete by this legislation. The Manual for Courts-Martial, United Slates
(1969) was promulgated by President Johnson and took effect January 1, 1969.
It was superseded on August 1, 1969, by the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (rev. ed. 1969), which was prescribed by an executive order of President
Nixon in order to conform to the changes effected by the Military Justice Act of
1968. Exec. Order No. 11,476, 3 C.F.R. 132 (1969 Compilation).
20. See SutrcoMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SUMMARY-REPORT OF HEARINGS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL (1963); 1962 Hearings; Joint Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and a
Special Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1
(1966).
21. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1 (art. 26(a)), 64 Stat. 117, as amended,
10 U.S.C. § 826(a) (1970).
22. See Act of May 5, 1950. ch. 169, § 1 (art. 51), 64 Stat. 124, as amended,
10 U.S.C. § 851 (1970).
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be a lawyer on the staff of the commander who, as convening au-
thority, had referred the charges to the court for trial. Thus, there
existed a real possibility of command influence.
Cognizant of these problems, the Army on its own initiative cre-
ated a field judiciary consisting of officers certified as law officers
whose primary duty was to serve on general courts-martial. The mem-
bers of this field judiciary were not under the command of local com-
manders. They were assigned from Washington, and their efficiency
reports were prepared in the Office of the Judge Advocate General of
the Army. 3 The Navy and Marine Corps soon created similar field
judiciaries. The Air Force, on the other hand, contended that it did
not need such a system, which, in its opinion, would create personnel
problems without improving the quality of justice.
Unimpressed by the Air Force position, Congress required in the
1968 Act that each armed force have a trial judiciary for general
courts-martial. To enhance the prestige of the law officer, his title
was changed to military judge24 and his powers were enhanced signifi-
cantly. Specifically, the military judge was authorized to rule finally
on challenges, motions for findings of not guilty, all questions of law,
and any interlocutory question "other than the factual issue of mental
responsibility of the accused. ' 25  As the Act has been implemented,
each service now has a trial judiciary of officers whose primary duty is
service as military judges of general courts-martial, who are not subject
to any local commander in the field, and whose efficiency reports are
prepared in the Office of the Judge Advocate General.26
Moreover, the Act now provides that a special court-martial may
have a military judge and that no bad conduct discharge may be ad-
judged by a special court-martial unless a military judge has been de-
tailed to the trial, except in a case where a military judge could not be
detailed because of physical conditions or military exigencies.2 Addi-
tionally, each armed service may have a number of other commissioned
officers who are lawyers and who have been certified as being qualified
to serve as military judge for special courts-martial. For these officers,
23. See 1962 Hearings 838-40, 868, 904-05, 922-23; Karlen, How the Army Trains
Its Judges, 34 U. Mo. KAN. CiTY L. REv. 271 (1966); Wiener, The Army's Field
Judiciary System: A Notable Advance, 46 A.B.AJ. 1178 (1960).
24. U.C.MJ. art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1970).
25. Id. art. 51(b), 10 U.S.C. § 851(b).
26. See id. art. 26(c), 10 U.S.C. § 826(c).
27. Id. art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819. Under these circumstances, "the convening au-
thority shall make a detailed written statement, to be appended to the record, stating
the reason or reasons a military judge could not be detailed." Id.
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however, service as military judge need not be a primary duty.2 8 Also,
they may be subject to commanders in the field-including a com-
mander who convenes or reviews the special courts-martial on which
they sit as military judge.
Responding to allegations of command influence on defense coun-
sel and court members, the Act broadens previous prohibitions against
these extrajudicial pressures on the personnel of courts-martial. 20
Thus, a defense counsel may not be given a lower efficiency rating be-
cause of the zeal with which he represented an accused before a court-
martial; nor may performance of duty as a court member be consid-
ered in preparing any report or document to be used in determining
promotions, assignments, or retention on active duty. The pretrial in-
struction that a commander or his staff judge advocate may provide to
court members is also sharply curtailed.30
Beyond its extensive revision in the area of the powers and inde-
pendence of judicial personnel, the 1968 Act provided further reform
in the area of the procedural rights of the accused. Of particular sig-
nificance are the greater flexibility allowed the military defendant in
selecting the type of tribunal in which he is to be heard and the ex-
panded provision for counsel. In a federal district court, a defendant
may waive trial by jury if the Government and the court are willing.31
The Uniform Code, on the other hand, did not authorize an accused
to waive trial by the members of a general court-martial and be tried
by the law officer-the judge-of that court.32  The Military Justice
Act of 1968 now provides this right to an accused, contingent upon
28. See id. art. 26(a)-(c), 10 U.S.C. § 826(a)-(c).
29. See id. art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837.
30. Id. art. 37(a), 10 U.S.C. § 837(a). Under the 1951 Manual for Courts-
Martial, a convening authority could give
general instruction to the personnel of a court-martial which he has ap-
pointed, preferably before any cases have been referred to the court for
trial .... Such instruction may relate to the rules of evidence, burden of
proof, and presumption of innocence, and may include information as to
e state of discipline in the command, as to prevalence of offenses which
have impaired efficiency and discipline, and of command measures which
have been taken to prevent offenses. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTr L, UNITED
STATEs 38 (1951).
Pretrial instruction pursuant to this paragraph was upheld in United States v. Danzine,
12 U.S.C.M.A. 350, 30 C.M.R. 350 (1961). Because of complaints about giving pre-
trial instructions to court-martial members, the Army discontinued the practice in 1962.
See 1962 Hearings 869.
31. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965); Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276 (1930).
32. Under the original Uniform Code there was no provision for a law officer in a
special court-martial, and so only in general courts-martial was a waiver of trial by
the court-martial members even a theoretical possibility.
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the consent of the military judge but not requiring the Government's
approval."3 The waiver is permitted both for general courts-martial
and for special courts-martial to which a military judge has been de-
tailed. In practice, this right has been widely utilized by accused and
their counsel; a very high percentage of cases are now tried by the
military judge alone. 4
Although the Uniform Code required that legally qualified coun-
sel be appointed to represent the accused in a general court-martial,
there was no similar requirement for special courts-martial, which may
adjudge sentences including bad conduct discharge, six months' con-
finement at hard labor, and partial forfeiture of pay for six months. 5
The Military Justice Act of 1968 now prohibits a special court-martial
from adjudging a bad conduct discharge unless legally qualified coun-
sel has been appointed to represent the accused.36 Furthermore, it
requires that such counsel be provided in other special courts-martial
unless precluded by physicial conditions or military exigencies.3 '
The Uniform Code permitted an accused to object to trial by
summary court-martial if he had not been offered nonjudicial punish-
ment under article 15 of the Code.38  If, however, nonjudicial punish-
ment had been offered him and he had declined it, this objection was
not available. Thus, an enlisted man might be offered nonjudicial
punishment for a minor offense, decline to accept it, and then be sub-
jected to trial by summary court-martial-where no counsel was fur-
nished him 9 but where he might receive a sentence of up to thirty
days' confinement at hard labor and forfeiture of pay for the same pe-
riod. The 1968 Act now authorizes him to object to trial by summary
court-martial regardless of any prior offer of nonjudicial punishment.40
33. U.C.M.J. art. 16(1)(B), (2)(C), 10 U.S.C. §§ 816(1)(B), (2)(C) (1970).
34. For 1971, the Judge Advocate General of the Army reports:
Trials by military judge alone continued at a high percentage throughout the
year. About 95 percent of special courts-martial were tried by judge alone,
while the figure for general courts-martial was about 84 percent. These
trials resulted in a tremendous savings of line officer hours during the year.
1971 ANNUAL REPORT 20.
35. U.C.MJ. art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 819
(1970).
36. U.C.M.J. art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1970).
37. Id. art. 27(c)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 827(c)(1). In this event "the convening au-
thority shall make a detailed written statement, to be appended to the record, stating
why counsel with such qualifications could not be obtained. . . ." Id.
38. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1 (art. 20), 64 Stat. 114. See note 14 supra
for a brief summary of the relative punitive capacities of the basic military tribunals.
39. Two recent federal district court cases, however, have squarely held that the
accused in a summary court-martial is constitutionally entitled to representation by
counsel. See note 154 infra and accompanying text.
40. U.C.MJ. art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970).
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In that event the charges may be referred to a special or general court-
martial, where the accused will now normally be represented by a
qualified counsel and tried before a military judge. However, even
under the Act, it appears that if the accused is then convicted by the
special or general court-martial, his punishment will not necessarily
be limited to that which could have been imposed by a summary
court-martial. 41
Post-conviction rights of the accused were also expanded by the
Military Justice Act of 1968. The period for submitting a petition
for a new trial was extended from one to two years. 42 The Boards of
Review were redesignated as Courts of Military Review; their members
were termed appellate military judges; and these tribunals were sub-
jected to additional procedural safeguards. 43 For example, an element
of possible command influence was removed from the procedure by the
termination of the practice whereby the senior member of the Board
prepared fitness reports on the junior members' performance on the
Board for submission to military superiors. A procedure was made
available for deferring service of a sentence to confinement pending com-
pletion of appellate review.44 For cases not reviewed by a Court of
Military Review, the Judge Advocate General was granted broad au-
thority to review. 45
In addition to providing additional protections for the rights of the
accused, the Military Justice Act of 1968 significantly streamlined the
functioning of military justice-thereby pleasing the armed services as
well as the proponents of reform. Indeed, this streamlining was prob-
ably a major quid pro quo for the procedural safeguards which Senator
Ervin and others obtained in this legislation for military accused. The
Act's provision for waiver of trial by the full military jury in favor of
trial by military judge alone-an option which has been extensively
41. At one time it might have been argued that to allow a special or general court-
martial to impose upon an accused a punishment more severe than he might have re-
ceived from a summary court-martial would have a chilling effect on his statutory
right to object to trial by summary court-martial. See, e.g., Jackson V. United States,
390 U.S. 570 (1968). However, in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), which allowed a more severe sentence
after an appeal and de novo trial, it seems likely that the accused who has objected
to trial by summary court-martial could be held subject to a sentence more severe
than a summary court-martial might have imposed.
42. U.C.M.J. art. 73, 10 U.S.C. § 873 (1970).
43. Id. art. 66(g), 10 U.S.C. § 866(g).
44. Id. art. 57(d), 10 U.S.C. § 857(d). Service of confinement may be de-
ferred in the sole discretion of the convening authority or, if the accused is no
longer under his jurisdiction, the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction
over the command to which the accused is currently assigned.
45. See id. art. 69, 10 U.S.C. § 869; Everett, supra note 9, at 400.
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utilized4 6-has been a major factor in expediting military justice and
improving its efficiency. Moreover, the pre-1968 Uniform Code made
no provision for a pretrial session to dispose of procedural and inter-
locutory questions, with the result that impatient court-martial mem-
bers often waited for hours while the law officer and counsel dealt with
matters which in the federal district courts would have been disposed
of long before trial. The 1968 Act now authorizes such pretrial ses-
sions and thereby allows the military judge to consider motions to
suppress evidence, to receive the accused's plea, and to dispose of similar
procedural matters before the full court-martial convenes.4 7  The re-
sult is to render the court-martial a more efficient instrument of mili-
tary justice.
O'CALLAMN V. PARKER
In June 1969-after enactment of the Military Justice Act of
1968 but prior to its effective date4s -the Supreme Court substantially
constricted the scope of military jurisdiction. O'Callahan v. Parker
held that, at least within the United States in time of peace, courts-
martial could try only those offenses that were "service-connected.
'49
The criteria for service-connection were left somewhat imprecise, al-
though a subsequent Supreme Court decision made it clear that con-
duct occurring on a military installation would qualify as service-con-
nected.50
The majority opinion in O'Callahan emphasized that courts-mar-
tial do not utilize grand jury indictment or trial by jury. Since petty
offenses do not require grand jury indictment or trial by jury, it would
seem arguable that they are not subject to the requirement of service-
connection-as the Court of Military Appeals has since ruled.5  Sim-
ilarly, to the extent that the result in O'Callahan hinges solely on the
military court's denial of procedural safeguards available in the civilian
courts, the argument is persuasive that the decision lacks extraterritorial
effect.52  Since a large number of offenses committed by servicemen
overseas "are not cognizable in any civil court in the United States," 5
46. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
47. U.C.M.J. art. 39(a), 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (1970).
48. The effective date was August 1, 1969. See note 19 supra.
49. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). See authorities cited note 7 supra.
50. Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
51. United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969); Blumen-
feld, supra note 7, at 71; Everett, supra note 7, at 893 & n.178.
52. The Court of Military Appeals has ruled that O'Callahan does not apply to
offenses committed overseas. United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R.
64 (1969).
53. Id. at 67, 41 C.M.R. at 67.
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the accused serviceman's only alternative to military trial would be
trial in the courts of the host country-where grand jury indictment
and trial by jury would rarely be heard of, much less practiced.
In holding the right to trial by jury applicable to state prosecu-
tions, the Supreme Court ruled only prospectively.5 4  Therefore, in-
sofar as O'Callahan is grounded on the accused's right to jury trial,
parallel reasoning would suggest only prospective application of its
holding as well. The Court of Military Appeals has already so held,"
although the circuit courts have gone both ways on the retroactivity
issue.56 Furthermore, if the rationale of O'Callahan goes only to the
imperfect exercise of otherwise valid jurisdiction-rather than to a lack
of congressional power, through the armed services, to prosecute certain
conduct-then a serviceman's nonservice-connected acts could be made
subject to federal prosecution in a tribunal that offered grand jury indict-
ment and trial by jury.
However, the opinion in O'Callahan also relied on the majority's
interpretation of article I, section 8, clause 14 of the United States
Constitution, which gives Congress power "to make Rules for the Gov-
ernment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." There is, at
the very least, a strong intimation that this constitutional provision falls
short of giving Congress the power to prohibit conduct on the part of
military personnel that is not service-connected. In that event, the
argument for both the extraterritoriality and the retroactivity of O'Cal-
lahan is strengthened, since the very constitutional underpinnings of
the power to regulate nonmilitary conduct would be absent. Moreover,
the conclusion could be logically drawn that, even if grand jury in-
dictment and trial by jury were provided, federal jurisdiction cannot
be created to enable the armed services rather than the normal prosecu-
torial agencies to prosecute a serviceman for conduct that is not service-
connected.
Regardless of the soundness of its rationale and result, O'Callahan
has helped to create a new look in military justice. 7  For one thing,
the potential caseload of courts-martial has been diminished by elimi-
54. De Stafano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). See Everett, supra note 7, at
888-89.
55. Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 41 C.M.R. 264 (1970), holds that
O'Callahan is not retroactive.
56. Compare Gosa v. Mayden, 450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 407
U.S. 920 (1972) (O'Callahan applies prospectively only) with United States ex rel.
Flemings v. Chafee, 458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Warner v. Flem-
ings, 407 U.S. 919 (1972) (O'Callahan applies retroactively). The Supreme Court
has heard oral argument in both cases, 41 U.S.L.W. 3326 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1972); and a
decision is pending as this article goes to press.
57. For varying views on O'Callahan, see authorities cited note 7 supra.
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nation of all offenses that are not service-connected-at least within
the United States. Secondly, the composition of the caseload has been
altered. Civil-type offenses, such as murder, rape, and larceny, can
no longer be tried by court-martial unless they occurred on a military
post or involved a military victim. Likewise, the occasion for conflict
between military and civilian authorities in determining which shall
prosecute such offenses has been reduced; generally, only the civilian au-
thorities will have jurisdiction to prosecute. Thirdly, there has been
injected into military trials an issue that was not previously encoun-
tered-namely, the service-connection of the offense.," As a result, a
new avenue has become available to attack court-martial convictions
collaterally in the civilian courts, since absence of service-connection will
deprive the court-martial of its jurisdiction.59
Although one reading of O'Callahan would permit Congress to
authorize the prosecution of nonservice-connected offenses in federal
district courts, no effort to do so seems likely. Thus, except for petty
offenses, a military commander cannot take action against conduct
which is not service-connected. Moreover, if he orders his personnel
to refrain from conduct which is not service-connected, the legality of
the order would seem highly questionable. In short, military justice
since O'Callahan does not give commanders the same breadth of con-
trol over their subordinates which they previously possessed.
Perhaps the opinion in O'Callahan has had some tendency to alle-
viate pressure for change within military justice. The occasions for
military justice to impinge on servicemen, their families, and friends
were lessened. The instances were fewer when a civil-type offense,
familiar to state and federal civil courts, would be tried by the un-
familiar procedures of courts-martial. On the other hand, the vehe-
mence of the criticism of military justice in O'Callahan may have
given added impetus to pressures for change from sources external to
the military.
JUDICIAL VINDICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF SERVICEMEN
Until 1953-two years after the Uniform Code of Military Justice
took effect-there had been no clear Supreme Court decision or legis-
58. Prior to O'Callahan, the word "service-connection" had never been used by
the Court of Military Appeals and had appeared in only one Board of Review opinion.
Congress had been concerned with service-connection chiefly in the area of retirement
benefits and disability pay. See Everett, supra note 7, at 870.
59. In view of the exhaustion of remedies requirement, the question arises whether
absence of service-connection can be asserted in a civil court prior to trial by court-
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lative pronouncement that military personnel were entitled to the pro-
tections of the Constitution. Moreover, although court-martial con-
victions had sometimes been attacked collaterally in the federal dis-
trict courts, the sole test for such attacks had apparently been the ju-
risdiction of the court-martial. 60 In that respect, albeit in a different
context, the Supreme Court had recognized that constitutional viola-
tions could sometimes affect a court's jurisdiction to proceed with a
trial.61
In Burns v. Wilson62 a court-martial conviction for murder and
rape and the accompanying death sentence were collaterally attacked
by means of a petition for habeas corpus in a federal district court.
Chief Justice Vinson, writing for himself and three other Justices,
noted that the "military courts, like the state courts, have the same
responsibilities as do the federal courts to protect a person from a vio-
lation of his constitutional rights. ' 63 However, he went on to deny the
application for habeas corpus since the military authorities had dealt
fully and fairly with the petitioners' allegations that they had been de-
nied due process in their trial. Although the Vinson opinion did not
command a full majority, examination of the dissents makes clear that
the Supreme Court had authorized the federal civil courts to under-
take collateral review of court-martial action if military authorities
failed to give full consideration to constitutional claims made by the
accused.64 Thus, Burns v. Wilson gave tacit recognition that military
personnel have some constitutional rights in the administration of mili-
tary justice and also provided some means of vindicating those rights.
In United States v. Augenblick65 the Supreme Court in 1969 re-
fused to allow the extension of collateral review to include errors not
martial and appellate review within the military establishment. See id. at 894-95.
Cf. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972); Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969).
60. See Miatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147,
150 (1890).
61. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
62. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
63. Id. at 142.
64. In dissent Justices Douglas and Black contended that the accused were en-
titled to a judicial hearing on the claims that their confessions were involuntary. How-
ever, they conceded that if "the military agency has fairly and conscientiously applied
the standards of due process formulated by this Court, . . .a rehash of the same facts
by a federal court would not advance the cause of justice." Id. at 154 (dissenting
opinion). Recently a court of appeals ruled that federal courts should apply the same
standard to review of court-martial convictions that is utilized in review of state court
convictions on habeas corpus and should not be precluded from review of constitutional
claims by reason of prior full and fair consideration of those claims by military authori-
ties. Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
65. 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
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deemed of constitutional proportions. That same year, in Noyd v.
Bond,0 a requirement of exhaustion of remedies was upheld by the
Supreme Court. As a result, the military accused cannot seek review
in the federal civil courts until their remedies within the military sys-
tem have been exhausted.
Despite the uncertainty in other tribunals, the Court of Military
Appeals has long since embraced the view "that the protections in the
Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary im-
plication, inapplicable, are available to members of our armed
forces." 7 More recently it has recognized the availability of extraordi-
nary remedies, such as the writ of error coram nobis, within the system
of military justice itself, 8 thus providing an additional weapon for pro-
tection of the constitutional rights of service personnel. Just as has
been true in some states which have developed post-conviction pro-
cedures for collateral review, one inducement for approving extraordi-
nary remedies in military justice was probably to insulate court-martial
convictions more completely from civilian court review. In any event,
the result has been to provide military lawyers with an array of extra-
ordinary writs and remedies similar to those utilized in the civilian courts.
INNOVATION BY TnE ARMED SERVICES
Although the new look in military justice owes much to Congress
and the courts, the armed services have in several instances displayed
notable innovativeness in changing the system. For example, the
Army took the initiative in removing law officers from the control of
commanders in the field and placing them in a field judiciary responsi-
ble to the Judge Advocate General. 69  The Air Force has undertaken,
and recently extended, a pilot program whereunder the military judges
for special courts-martial are also placed in the trial judiciary and in-
sulated from the nonlegal chain of command. 70  The Air Force has
66. 395 U.S. 683 (1969).
67. United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246
(1960). See also United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
68. See United States v. Snyder, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 40 C.M.R. 192 (1969); United
States v. Bevilacqua, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 39 C.M.R. 10 (1968). See also Everett,
supra note 9.
69. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
'0. On June 1, 1971, the pilot project for the Air Force Judiciary Trial
Division officially began its test period. This project, which was discussed
in the January 1, 1970-December 31, 1970 report, is one in which some 15
judge advocates were assigned as fulltime trial and defense counsel and spe-
cial court-martial military judges within geographical districts within the 2d
Circuit of the eastern U.S. Judiciary Region. They work out of offices at
Maxwell APB, Ala., Keesler AFB, Miss., MacDill AFB, Fla., and Shaw
AFB, S.C. All report directly to The Judge Advocate General rather than
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also begun to establish a full-time trial and defense bar for courts-mar-
tial-composed of counsel who are not subject to assignment or evalu-
ation by unit commanders. In a similar vein, the Navy has developed
law centers where legal activities are centralized and more thoroughly
isolated from the possible influence of general command headquarters.
The Army has provided for military magistrates authorized to is-
sue search warrants and to order release from pretrial confinement,"1
lessening somewhat the scope of possible abuse of command discretion
in those areas. The Army has also formalized the negotiation of guilty
pleas by requiring the use of written pretrial agreements between the
accused and the convening authority, 2 thus foreclosing many of the
abuses associated with informal plea bargaining.
The services have also taken significant steps to upgrade the
quality of their legal personnel and facilities. The Army, for exam-
ple, has established a Judge Advocate General's School, which has
generated innovative research in military law. The Air Force has cre-
ated new facilities for retraining and rehabilitating convicted airmen.
73
And the Navy has introduced the use of stenomask court reporting-a
useful means of combating the shortage of conventionally trained court
reporters.
More substantial innovation by the services may be expected to
result from the recommendations of the Report of the Task Force on
the Administration of Military Justice in the Armed Forces, 4 pre-
pared for the Department of Defense by a diverse collection of civilians
and military officers. Pursuant to that report, the Secretary of De-
fense has already ordered the implementation of some significant re-
forms, including a requirement that "adequate legal advice" be made
available to the accused before any action may be taken against him
field commanders. The test period was concluded on November 30, 1971,
and is currently undergoing an evaluation with a view toward determining
its feasibility for worldwide adoption. 1971 ANNuAL REPORT 33.
A similar approach was suggested in 1962 by Dean A. Kenneth Pye. See 1962
Hearings 548-49. The pilot program has apparently been successful and is being ex-
panded. See Am FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENFAL REP., Aug., 1972, at 21.
71. 1971 ArNruAL REPoRT 3, 21-22.
72. For discussion of the plea-bargaining practices in the various armed services,
see 1962 Hearings 843, 870-71, 905, 923, 937. See also United States v. Watkins,
11 U.S.C.M.A. 611, 29 C.M.R. 427 (1960) (expressing the judges' view on the nego-
tiated guilty plea program); McMenamin, Plea Bargaining in the Military, 10 AM.
CSIM. L. REv. 93, 94 (1971) (favoring the visibility of the written pretrial agree-
ment). The military procedure tends to avoid problems like those present in Santo-
bello v. New York, 405 U.S. 257 (1971).
73. 1962 Hearings 943-44.
74. TASK FORCE REPORT.
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under article 15. 7 5 The Secretary further ordered that the services
take initial steps towards removing all military defense counsel from
command control by placing them under the authority of the Judge
Advocate General.
A COMPARISON WITH CIVILIAN JUSTICE
Preliminary Caveats
To ask how, in light of recent developments, military justice com-
pares with that found in the civilian setting may be misleading. The
question implies that military justice is monolithic, when such is not
the case. For example, the Air Force for many years has experienced
a much lighter caseload, both in absolute and in percentage terms, than
have the other armed services. 76  Thus, it was able to provide lawyers
as defense counsel in almost all special courts-martial long before this
practice became feasible in the other services. Similarly, the Air
Force has consistently refused to allow the plea bargaining which is
permitted in the other armed services. Moreover, even within a given
service, commands may differ in their disciplinary problems. Finally,
regardless of the particular service, the quality of military justice availa-
ble at some remote outpost may be inferior to that dispensed at a ma-
jor installation in the United States.
Similarly, there are many brands of civilian justice. For Ameri-
can personnel stationed overseas, perhaps the most important civilian
courts are those of the foreign countries where they are assigned.
Many of these countries are subject to basic requirements of procedural
75. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to the Secretaries of
the Military Departments on the REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION
OF MILITARY JusncE IN TE ARMED FoRcEs, Jan. 11, 1973.
76. This is especially remarkable in light of the fact that the Air Force has over
720,000 personnel, as compared to some 590,000 in the Navy and 200,000 in the
Marine Corps. The Army has over 1,120,000 personnel. 1973 WORLn ALMANAC
AND BOOK OF FAcrs 493-96.
During the fiscal year 1971, the Army tried 2,751 persons by general court-
martial, 27,989 persons by special court-martial, and 14,996 by summary court-
martial-a total of 45,736 persons. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 18. During fiscal year
1971, the Air Force convened 194 general courts-martial, 1,896 special courts-martial,
and 308 summary courts-martial-a total of 2,398. Id. at 34. Thus, the total number
of courts-martial of all types tried in the Air Force during fiscal year 1971 was less
than the number of persons tried by general court-martial in the Army. The Navy's
figures are below the Army's in all categories but substantially above the Air Force's,
the total of all courts-martial being 28,762 for fiscal year 1971. Id. at 32. To some
degree, the disparity in the number of courts-martial among the various services re-
flects, aside from discrepancies in personnel totals, differences in disciplinary policies;
but other causes probably include differences in type of personnel and in the mission
of the various services.
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fairness imposed by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement77 or simi-
lar treaties; but these agreements do not purport to afford all the safe-
guards contained in either the Bill of Rights or the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. Ironically, from the standpoint of accused service-
men, results in foreign civil courts might compare favorably with those
either in courts-martial or in American civilian courts, since, although
the conviction rate is high, the sentences have tended to be light.78
With respect to civilian justice within the United States, the most
significant comparison might be between courts-martial and state
courts. In view of the limitations on criminal jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts, misconduct of a serviceman, if not tried by court-martial
will far more likely be subject to state rather than federal prosecu-
tion. Of course, among the states there are numerous variations in
criminal procedure. Some use grand juries; some do not. Some pro-
vide for separate trial on an issue of mental responsibility; others do
not. In short, the variations are extensive.
In some respects both the differences in state court procedures
and the differences between state and federal criminal procedure have
been reduced in recent years. Selective incorporation of substantial
portions of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment has assimilated state criminal trials more and more
to the federal model. More recently, however, the Supreme Court has
suggested that certain constitutional guarantees have less scope than
might previously have been supposed.79 Thus, state courts are being
granted greater freedom to deviate from the criminal procedure em-
ployed in the federal courts than is generally recognized.
77. Article VII, paragraph 9 of this Agreement provides for speedy trial, notice of
the charges, confrontation, compulsory process, legal representation, an interpreter,
and communication with a representative of the accused serviceman's government.
NATO Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No.
2846. Of course, these procedural requirements may not have possessed the same
meaning for all the countries that signed the agreement. See J. SNEE & A. PYE,
STATUS oF FoRcEs AGRnErmNr: CRIMINAL JtURISDIMoN 94-101, 106-20 (1957).
One writer viewed the safeguards required by this Agreement as the precursor to an
international Bill of Procedural Rights. See R. ELLERT, NATO "FAIR TRIAL" SAFE-
GUAmDS (1963).
78. This tendency probably reflects in large part the host country's reluctance
to be saddled with the expense of providing penal facilities for foreign personnel,
whose rehabilitation can be of little or no interest to it-not to mention the host gov-
ernment's usual reluctance to ruffle its diplomatic relations with the United States.
79. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (state conviction of felony
by less-than-unanimous jury verdict held not in violation of right to trial by jury);
William$ v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (state rule requiring defendant relying on
alibi to make pretrial disclosure of alibi witnesses' names to prosecutor held not to
violate privilege against self-incrimination).
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Despite the preceding caveats, it seems particularly appropriate to
compare briefly some of the procedures and safeguards in courts-mar-
tial with those in the federal district courts. Both tribunals are crea-
tures of the same sovereign. 0 Furthermore, Congress directed that,
in prescribing the procedure for courts-martial, the President shall, "so
far as he deems practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules
of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts .. ."8" And, in defining the proper
role of the law officer-now military judge-the Court of Military Ap-
peals has looked to the model of the federal district judge.8 2 There-
fore, this discussion adopts the federal district courts as a model for
the comparison of civilian and military justice.
Grand Jury Indictment
Only in the fifth amendment does the Bill of Rights contain an ex-
press exception applicable to military trials; 3 and there the exception
appears to concern only the requirement of grand jury indictment.
Accordingly, trials by court-martial are not based on grand jury in-
dictment.8 4  Except for petty offenses or where there has been waiver
of indictment, however, a prosecution in a federal district court must
stem from an indictment. In O'Callahan v. Parker, Justice Douglas rea-
soned that the severe limitation imposed by that case on military juris-
diction would help preserve a serviceman's right to grand jury indict-
ment. A fallacy of that argument is that a serviceman who is tried by
civilian court, rather than court-martial, will usually be tried in a state
court. Up to the present time there is no constitutional requirement
that state courts use grand juries; 5 and many states authorize prose-
cution on information, rather than on indictment.86  Thus, despite
O'Callahan, a serviceman may not receive the protection of a grand
jury indictment.
80. Cf. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
81. UC.M.J. art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1970).
82. For different opinions concerning this transformation, see Miller, Who Made
the Law Officer a "Federal Judge"? 4 MILrrARY L. REV. 39 (1959); Quinn, Courts-
Martial Practice: A View from the Top, 22 HAST. L.J. 201, 208-10 (1971).
83. The applicable portion of the fifth amendment reads as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces . . . . U.S. CONST. amend. V
(emphasis added).
84. Chenoweth v. Van Arsdall, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 46 C.M.R. 183 (1973).
85. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), has not yet been overruled.
86. As of 1969, twenty-two states authorized prosecution of felonies by informa-
tion as well as by indictment. See L. HALL, Y. IwsA, W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL,
MODERN CRMNAL PocnURE 788-89 (3d ed. 1969).
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Furthermore, considerable disillusionment has arisen with respect to
the grand jury's role as a safeguard for accused persons. Proceedings
before a grand jury are in secret, and an accused usually may not even
examine the transcript of testimony on the basis of which he was in-
dicted. The prosecutor generally determines which prospective wit-
nesses will testify; and neither a prospective accused nor his counsel
is allowed to be present and cross-examine witnesses called before the
grand jury. Moreover, failure of one grand jury to return a true bill
does not preclude another grand jury from doing so later, as successive
grand jury proceedings do not constitute double jeopardy.
Although the Uniform Code does not provide for grand jury in-
dictment, article 32 of the Code does call for pretrial investigation be-
fore charges may be referred to a general court-martial 8 ---the only
kind of court-martial that can adjudge a sentence of dishonorable dis-
charge, total forfeiture of pay, or confinement for more than six
months. Thus, the cases that are not subject to pretrial investigation
are somewhat comparable to the "petty offenses" for which neither
grand jury indictment nor trial by jury would seem constitutionally re-
quired.8
8
The pretrial investigation results in sworn testimony, which is
known to the accused and generally subject to cross-examination. If
the accused chooses to testify, his own counsel is present to assist him.
Thus, with respect to discovery of evidence and opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses, the pretrial investigation provides the defendant op-
portunities that would not be available in civilian courts. A subpoena
can be issued to compel a witness to appear before a grand jury. Un-
der the Code's wording it seems doubtful that a subpoena may be is-
sued to compel a witness to testify in an article 32 pretrial investiga-
tion."' In civilian courts the requirement of public trial does not ex-
87. U.C.M.J. art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1970). Also, there must be advice by the
convening authority's staff judge advocate, and the convening authority may not refer
a charge to a general court-martial unless he has found that it alleges an offense and
is warranted by the evidence. Id. art. 34, 10 U.S.C. § 834.
88. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). See Dyke v. Taylor Implement
Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937);
Act of June 25, 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal
Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. RaV. 917
(1926).
89. The Code provides that the "trial counsel, the defense counsel, and the
court-martial shall have equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and other evidence."
U.C.M.J. art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1970). This wording seems to contemplate
a case that has already been referred to a court-martial for trial, although the accused
may have a "defense counsel" during the pretrial investigation. Id. art. 32(b), 10
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tend to grand jury proceedings, which are conducted in secret.90 It
is unclear whether the article 32 investigation is sufficiently akin to a
grand jury investigation as to authorize exclusion of the public.
In the federal courts, a United States attorney may not be obli-
gated to prosecute even though a grand jury has indicted; but he can-
not go to trial without a grand jury indictment." A military com-
mander, on the other hand, is not bound by the recommendations of
the officer who conducts the pretrial investigation required by article
32; the charges may be referred for trial even though the investigator
recommends to the contrary. However, it remains debatable whether
a military accused is significantly more exposed to a risk of unfair
prosecution than a defendant would be in a federal district court. The
relationship of a civilian prosecutor to the grand jury usually makes it
possible for him to obtain the indictments that he desires. Moreover,
it is likely that, as military justice has become more sophisticated and
professionalized, the typical commander has become less willing to
override a recommendation by an article 32 investigator or by his own
staff judge advocate that charges not be referred for trial. Indeed, a
commander may have every inclination not to refer borderline cases
for trial since a high court-martial rate is sometimes considered an in-
dication of poor leadership.
Double Jeopardy
The fifth amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy is not
subject to an express exception for military trials, but the original
military practice was apparently quite tolerant of successive prosecu-
tion.92 The Uniform Code, however, has since conferred a protection
against double jeopardy.9 3  Moreover, by prohibiting a more severe
U.S.C. § 832(b). Article 47, which proscribes refusal to appear or testify, refers to a
person "duly subpoenaed to appear as a witness before a court-martial, military
commission, court of inquiry, or any other military court or board. . . ." Id. art. 47,
10 U.S.C. § 847. There is no penalty for failure to appear or testify before an officer
appointed to investigate pursuant to article 32. Since a court of inquiry is included
under article 47 and since an investigation by a court of inquiry would probably sat-
isfy the requirements of article 32 under certain circumstances, a court of inquiry
might be convened to investigate a suspected offense if it appeared desirable to have
the power available to subpoena witnesses to testify concerning the offense.
90. With respect to the secrecy of the grand jury, see Dennis v. United States,
384 U.S. 855 (1966); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
91. Cf. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965).
92. See Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice
(pts. 1-2), 72 HAv. L. REv. 1, 266 (1958).
93. 6ee U.C.MJ. arts. 44, 62-63, 10 U.S.C. §§ 844, 862-63 (1970).
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sentence in the event of a rehearing, the Code eliminates a danger
that, at least in a minor degree, still exists in the civilian courts. 4
Since a court-martial is a federal tribunal, a serviceman cannot be
prosecuted in both a district court and in a court-martial for what
amounts to the same conduct. 5  With respect to prosecution in both
a court-martial and a state court, the same rule-whatever it may be-
would seem to apply that would govern dual prosecution in a state
court and a federal district court.96 However, the O'Callahan case re-
duces the possiblity of such successive prosecutions, since conduct that
falls within the jurisdiction of the state court often will lack the service-
connection necessary for court-martial jurisdiction. Furthermore, mili-
tary policy does not favor these successive prosecutions.97
Under habitual offender provisions in the Manual for Courts-
Martial, prior military convictions may be a basis for increasing the
maximum punishment that may be imposed. 8 However, such provi-
sions, which have parallels in many civilian criminal codes, are not
usually considered to involve double jeopardy. Similarly, the use of
military convictions to support administrative action unfavorable to the
accused-such as undesirable discharge from the armed services0 0-is
not deemed to create double jeopardy and has considerable precedent
in civilian life.100 An attorney, for example, may be disbarred ad-
94. Under North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), a heavier sentence
may be imposed at a retrial in light of events subsequent to the original trial. This
is not permitted under the Uniform Code.
95. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
96. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). But cf. Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
97. MANuAL 215b.
98. The Manual provides that three or more previous ,convictions during the
year preceding commission of any offense of which the accused stands convicted will
authorize dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures of pay and allowances, and confine-
ment for one year. Two or more previous convictions during the three years pre-
ceding commission of any offense of which the accused stands convicted will authorize
bad conduct discharge, total forfeitures, and confinement for three months. Imposi-
tion of nonjudicial punishment is not a prior conviction for these purposes. Id. 127c
(6), § B.
99. See Everett, Military Administrative Discharges-The Pendulum Swings, 1966
DuxE LJ. 41, 58, 78.
100. Conviction of traffic offenses often leads to suspension or revocation of a
driver's license. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16 (Supp. 1965). See also, e.g.,
41 U.S.C. §§ 10b(b), 37 (1970), authorizing the debarment of bidders who have vio-
lated the Davis-Bacon and Walsh-Healy Acts. Civil penalties often are authorized
without regard to the results of criminal proceedings which arise from the same facts.
See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938);
Various Items v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
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ministratively upon the basis of a prior criminal conviction. 10 1
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
In article 31 the Uniform Code requires that, before a serviceman
accused or suspected of an offense may be interrogated or asked for a
statement, he must be informed of the nature of the accusation and ad-
vised that he need not make any statement regarding the offense and
that any statement he does make may be used in evidence against him
in a trial by court-martial.' 02 When the Code took effect in 1951,
there was little precedent for this warning requirement. In fact, the
Supreme Court later relied on article 31 to help justify the Miranda
warning requirement. 0 3 Miranda also included the requirement that
the accused be advised of his right to counsel, which is not demanded
by article 31; but the Court of Military Appeals has since held that
Miranda applied fully to the armed services from the date of its de-
cision.' 04 Furthermore, article 31 continues to call for a warning of
the right to remain silent without regard to the custodial interrogation
that brings Miranda into play.10
In its interpretation of the wording of article 31, the Court of
Military Appeals has concluded that service personnel may not be
compelled to furnish handwriting'0 6 or voice exemplars10 7 or even to
submit to blood tests& 0 8 in connection with criminal investigations.
The Supreme Court has taken a far more limited view of the protection
afforded by the fifth amendment; 0 9 and, as to blood tests at least, the
101. 7 AM. JuR.r 2D, Attorneys at Law §§ 12-72 (1963).
102. U.C.MJ. art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1970).
103. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 489 (1966).
104. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
105. The Supreme Court has interpreted "custodial interrogation" rather liberally.
See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
Thus, the gap between the applicability of article 31 and Miranda has been reduced.
In military justice the admissibility of a confession under article 31 must be ruled
upon by both the military judge and the military jury, which must disregard it entirely
unless convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it was voluntary. MANUAL 140a.
In the civilian setting, however, proof beyond, reasonable doubt is not required to
establish voluntariness. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
106. United States v. Penn, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 194, 39 C.M.R. 194 (1969); United
States v. White, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 211, 38 C.M.R. 9 (1967); United States v. Eggers,
3 U.S.C.M.A. 191, 11 C.M.R. 191 (1953); United States v. Rosato, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 143,
11 C.M.R. 143 (1953). See also United States v. Minnifield, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 373,
26 C.M.RL 153 (1958) (handwriting exemplar constitutes a "statement" for purposes
of article 31).
107. United States v. Greer, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 576, 13 C.M.R. 132 (1953).
108. United States v. Musguire, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 25 C.M.R. 329 (1958); cf.
United States v. Jordan, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 452, 22 C.M.R. 242 (1957) (urine specimen).
109. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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most recent Manual for Courts-Martial seems to follow the Supreme
Court, rather than the Court of Military Appeals."10 Although the
President has been delegated broad power to prescribe rules of evi-
dence to be used in military tribunals, this power can only be exer-
cised in a manner consistent with provisions of the Uniform Code."'
Thus, it is questionable that the President may change the Manual for
Courts-Martial to overrule the Court of Military Appeals in its inter-
pretation of the scope of the statutory protection granted by article 31.
In military law, as under the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
communications by a patient to his physician are not privileged." 2
Moreover, a military accused may be compelled to submit to psychia-
tric examination by government psychiatrists as a condition precedent
to the admission at trial of his own psychiatric evidence."' A medi-
cal or psychiatric examination may not require an article 31 warn-
ing, 1 4 but prosecution comment on a refusal by the defendant to an-
swer the medical examiner's questions is error."";
In civilian courts, regulatory agencies, and legislative committees,
grants of immunity have been a useful tool for obtaining incriminating
testimony from recalcitrant witnesses. Recently the Supreme Court
ruled that the immunity granted need only be against use of the in-
criminating testimony, rather than against prosecution for the transac-
tions revealed by the testimony." 6  The Manual for Courts-Martial
authorizes certain military commanders to grant immunity from trial;"
17
and since no provision is made for the limited testimonial immunity,
it would appear that only the broader transactional immunity can be
conferred. Of course, the President could change this situation by is-
suing an Executive Order which makes appropriate amendments to
the Manual.
In both military and civilian life, numerous reporting requirements
are encountered; and the required reports may often prove incrimi-
110. See MANUAL 152.
111. U.C.MJ. art. 36(a)-(b), 10 U.S.C. § 836(a)-(b) (1970).
112. MANUAL f 151c(2). Rule 504 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
recognizes a psychotherapist-patient privilege, subject to certain exceptions, but does
not provide a general physician-patient privilege.
113. United States v. Babbidge, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 327, 40 C.M.R. 39 (1969).
114. Id.; United States v. Malumphy, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 639, 31 C.M.R. 225 (1962);
United States v. Baker, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 313, 29 C.M.R. 129 (1960).
115. United States v. Kemp, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 89, 32 C.M.R. 89 (1962).
116. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
117. MAN AL 1 68h. A convening authority and his staff judge advocate are dis-
qualified to participate in the review of a court-martial, if previously they have par-
ticipated in granting immunity to a Government witness in the case. United States v.
Diaz, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 52, 46 C.M.R. 52 (1972).
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nating. Some military commands, for instance, may require service-
men to file a report of any off-base automobile accidents in which they
were involved. 118 The O'Callahan decision would seem to eliminate
the power of military authorities to require reports on activities that
have no service-connection.11 9 In other respects the principles appli-




In contrast with its demonstrated concern for the protection of ser-
vicemen against self-incrimination, Congress has not legislated against
unreasonable searches and seizures in the military establishment.
However, long before either the enactment of the Uniform Code or the
decision in Mapp v. Ohio,'2' the Manual for Courts-Martial had pro-
hibited unreasonable searches and seizures and excluded from evidence
the products thereof.1
2
While the off-post house and property of a serviceman may be
searched only under the same rules that apply to a civilian, searches on
a military installation may be authorized on the sole authority of a
military commander. Of course, a military commander is hardly the
"neutral and detached magistrate" who must issue search warrants in
the civilian courts.' 23 Whether this constitutes a major disparity depends
on the extent to which the typical magistrate has displayed impartiality
and detachment in the issuance of warrants. In any event, the armed
services seem to be transferring to "military magistrates" some of the
commander's authority for authorizing searches. 24
118. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 240, 26 C.M.R. 20 (1958).
119. It would be hard to accept the argument that a report was service-connected
if all the matters to which it related lacked service-connection. Thus, disobedience of
the order to make the report would not be service-connected and so not subject to
punishment.
120. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971); Grosso v. United States, 390
U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). (constitutional limitations on reporting requirements).
Prosecutions for failure to comply with the reporting requirements of military regula-
tions were involved in United States v. Kauffman, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 283, 34 C.M.R. 63
(1963), and United States v. Smith, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 240, 26 C.M.R. 20 (1958). See also
Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
121. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
122. MANUAL FOR Coupas-MARAiTu, UNrrED STATES 152 (1951). For the current
provision, see MANuAL 152.
123. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
124. See note 71 supra and accompanying text
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Although the Court of Military Appeals has ruled that permission
to search may be granted by a commander only upon a showing of
probable cause, 5 it has not yet required that an affidavit be executed
setting forth the facts believed to constitute probable cause. 2 , How-
ever, the court has encouraged the use of written statements to record
the facts constituting probable cause;12 7 and the services seem to be ac-
ceding to this judicial persuasion. 128  Presumably, as military magis-
trates begin to play a greater part in authorizing searches, there will
be even greater insistence on documentation of the grounds for a
search.
There have been many complaints from servicemen about "shake-
down inspections," whereby, without any showing of probable cause,
a general inspection is made of a barracks or other large area. The
current Manual for Courts-Martial contains an exception from other-
wise applicable restrictions on searches for "administrative inspec-
tions." 2 9  In the parallel situation of administrative inspections in
civilian life, the Supreme Court generally requires a court order; but
the conditions for obtaining such authorization are less onerous than
those for obtaining a search warrant to seek evidence of a crime."'0
Furthermore, the Court has on at least one recent occasion left possible
leeway for administrative inspections in the civilian setting without
prior judicial authorization.' 3'
125. United States v. Brown, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 28 C.M.R. 48 (1959).
126. For applications of this requirement in the federal courts, see Spinelli v.
United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
127. In United States v. Martinez, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 40, 36 C.M.R. 196 (1966), it
is suggested that authority to search be in writing and that it set out the facts upon
which the authorization is based and the articles to be seized.
128. See United States v. Penman, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 69, 36 C.M.R. 223, 225
(1966).
129. See MANUAL 152. After setting forth a restriction on permissible objects of
search, the Manual provides that this "restriction does not apply to administrative
inspections or inventories conducted in accordance with law, regulation, or custom."
Id. In the corresponding paragraph of the 1951 Manual, there is no reference to
"administrative inspections," but an exception is recognized for the legality of searches
made by military personnel "in accordance with military custom." MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES % 152 (1951). The Court of Military Appeals has
been willing to uphold "shakedown" inspections under some circumstances. United
States v. Gebhart, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 606, 28 C.M.R. 172 (1959); United States v.
Swanson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 671, 14 C.M.R. 89 (1954).
130. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967).
131. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), where the Supreme Court upheld ad-
ministrative home visitations as a valid prerequisite to certain welfare benefits. While
emphasizing that the visit was not a search in the traditional criminal law context,
the Court noted that even if it were so held, the visit was sustainable under the
fourth amendment's test of reasonableness. Id. at 317-18.
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Military courts have not proved blind to the danger that adminis-
trative inquiry might become a subterfuge for avoiding the probable
cause standard applicable to criminal investigation.'3 2 Moreover, it is
not unlikely that use of military magistrates to authorize searches will
be a precedent for their employment in determining whether adminis-
trative inspections should take place. To that extent, a reduction in
the incidence of abuse in this area may be anticipated.
For "apprehension"-which is the military term for the civilian
concept of arrest' 33 -no court order or even authorization from a
commander is necessary. However, there must be "reasonable belief
that an offense has been committed and that the person apprehended
committed it.'13 4  Basically this is the probable cause standard in the
civilian setting as well. 35 Once an arrest has been made, the search
incident to arrest may not exceed the guidelines enunciated in Chimel
v. California,130 limiting search to the area "within the immediate con-
trol" of the arrestee.
Military justice makes no express provision for "stop and frisk"
but presumably would apply the same rules applicable in the civilian
community. 37  Additionally, the Manual for Courts-Martial does not
deal with "no-knock searches" or the manner of entry to search and
seize; therefore, the principles of Ker v. California,38 allowing unan-
nounced entry where there is both probable cause to arrest and "exi-
gent" circumstances, would probably prevail in the military as well as
the civilian setting.
Various types of electronic surveillance are deemed by the Su-
preme Court to involve unreasonable searches for and seizures of con-
versation.13 9  At one time the Court of Military Appeals ruled that
wiretapping was permissible if done outside the United States 40 or on
132. For a recent case holding that, under the particular facts, the shakedown was
a search and not an inspection, see United States v. Lazerus, C.M. 42,877 (Army Court
of Military Review, Aug. 15, 1972).
133. U.C.M.J. art. 7, 10 U.S.C. § 807 (1970). The Code uses the term "arrest,"
on the other hand, to describe "the restraint of a person by an order, not imposed as a
punishment for an offense, directing him to remain within certain specified limits."
Id. art. 9(a), 10 U.S.C. § 809(a).
134. Id. art. 7(b), 10 U.S.C. § 807(b).
135. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
136. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
137. For "stop and frisk" cases, see Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
138. 374U.S. 23 (1963).
139. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41(1967).
140. United States v. Gopaulsingh, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 772, 19 C.M.R. 68 (1955).
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a purely military telephone system.' 41 These holdings, which were
predicated on the court's interpretation of section 605 of the Communi-
cations Act,142 have not been reexamined li light of the Supreme
Court's decisions, which rely on the fourth amendment. It seems
probable, however, that they would no longer apply and that service
personnel would be no more vulnerable to electronic surveillance than
their civilian counterparts. Moreover, the armed services have them-
selves imposed strict limitations on electronic surveillance.1
48
Military judges are not yet included among the judges who are
empowered to issue orders authorizing the interception of wire or oral
communications.344  Thus, if law enforcement agents wish to place a
serviceman under electronic surveillance, authority must be sought
from a federal district or circuit court judge-or, in certain emergency
situations, from the Attorney General.1
45
Since the scope of the fourth amendment's protection from un-
reasonable search and seizure is often couched in terms of the com-
plainant's "reasonable expectations of privacy" in a given situation, 45
141. United States v. Noce, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 715, 19 C.M.R. 11 (1955).
142. Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1962), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1970) (pursuant to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 18 App., 28, 42,
47 U.S.C.) ).
143. See, e.g., Use of Wiretapping and Eavesdropping in Conduct of Investigations,
Air Force Reg. No. 124-18 (July 23, 1970); Early, Interception of Communications by
Air Force Agents, 10 AnR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL. L. REv. 8 (1968).
144. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(9), 2516 (1970). The Task Force Report recom-
mends that military judges be cast in the image of civilian judges and be granted added
powers--among them the power to issue search warrants based on probable cause.
TASK FORCE REPORT 83-85, 124. However, the Report does not deal expressly with
the matter of extension of the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 to permit military judges to issue orders for the interception of
wire or oral communications.
145. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)
(1970), providing:
[Amny investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the
Attorney General or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or
subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, who reasonably
determines that-(a) an emergency situation exists with respect to conspira-
torial activities threatening the national security interest or to conspiratorial
activities characteristic of organized crime that requires a wire or oral com-
munication to be intercepted before an order authorizing such interception
can with due diligence be obtained, and (b) there are grounds upon which
an order could be entered under this chapter to authorize such interception,
may intercept such wire or oral communication if an application for an or-
der approving the interception is made . . . within forty-eight hours after the
interception has occurred, or begins to occur.
The definition of "investigative or law enforcement officer" in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7)
(1970) would seem to include certain categories of military officials.
146. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (concurring opinion).
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it might be contended that fourth amendment protections are attenu-
ated in those situations where servicemen are billeted together in a
barracks. Given the relatively unrestrained entry of both residents and
nonresidents into a barracks, it would seem that the expectation of
privacy of the personnel living in a barracks would necessarily be less
than that of a civilian dwelling in a private home. The extent to
which such considerations might lower the level of fourth amendment
protections available to the barracks-dwelling serviceman presents trou-
blesome questions beyond the scope of this Article.
Right to Counsel
The Military Justice Act of 1968 required that an accused be
provided legally qualified counsel to represent him not only in general
courts-martial but also in almost all special courts-martial. 1417  Fur-
thermore, if he is brought to trial before a summary court-martial, an
accused has an absolute statutory right to object thereto, in which
event he can only be tried by special or general court-martial.
1 48  If
offered nonjudicial punishment, the accused-unless he is attached to
or embarked in a vessel-may decline to accept nonjudicial punish-
ment.149  In that event the charge may be referred to a court-martial
for trial; but, if the charge is referred to a summary court-martial, the
accused still has the right to object to trial by that tribunal.'50 Thus,
as a practical matter, a serviceman who wishes to be represented by a
military lawyer has been provided by statute with the means to obtain
such representation, no matter how minor the offense with which he is
147. U.C.MJ. art. 27(c), 10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (1970). If a military lawyer can-
not be provided as defense counsel because of "physical conditions or military exigen-
cies," then the convening authority "shall make a detailed written statement, to be
appended to the record, stating why counsel with such qualifications could not be
obtained." Id. For the punitive scope of special courts-martial, see id. art. 19, 10
U.S.C. § 819; note 14 supra.
148. Id. art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820.
149. Id. art. 15(a), 10 U.S.C. § 815(a). The Task Force has also recommended
that a "serviceman have the right to obtain the advice of legally-qualified military
counsel before deciding whether to demand trial in lieu of non-judicial punishment
(except in those situations when the exigencies of the service limit the availability of
counsel)." TASK FORCE REPORT 120. Furthermore, the accused should receive a
"personal hearing before the commander contemplating the imposition of punishment";
and at this hearing he should have the right "to be accompanied by an available
personal representative, who may but need not be a lawyer, to advise him and to
make a statement on his behalf." Id.
150. U.Cd.MJ. art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970). In this respect there has been a
change in article 20 of the Uniform Code as it was originally enacted; under that pro-
vision an accused could not object to trial by summary court-martial if he had previ-
ously been offered nonjudicial punishment.
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charged. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense has recently directed that
"adequate legal advice" be made available to the accused prior to the
imposition of nonjudicial punishment.' It is not as yet clear whether
the "adequate legal advice" criterion is to be equated with the provi-
sion of legally qualified counsel, although that analysis would appear
to be the most likely interpretation. Given the complexity of the op-
tions available to the accused under article 15's nonjudicial punishment
procedures and the serious implications of waiver, it is unlikely that a
non-lawyer could provide "adequate legal advice" in most situations.
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin,'"52
it had seemed likely that the constitutional obligation to provide law-
yers for indigent criminal defendants in civilian courts did not extend to
"petty offenses," where the confinement imposable was six months or
less. Now no confinement seems imposable if counsel has not been
offered to the defendant. Since summary courts-martial have juris-
diction to try enlisted personnel and to impose up to thirty days' con-
finement, Argersinger has placed in question the validity of convic-
tions by such courts if counsel was unavailable. In view of the election
available to an accused to object to the jurisdiction of a summary court-
martial, it might be argued that, at least if he has been properly ad-
vised of his rights, failure to make such objection constitutes a waiver
of the right to counsel. On the other hand, the severe consequences
that may result from objecting to the jurisdiction of a summary court-
martial make less plausible the contention that failure to exercise that
election has the element of conscious choice requisite for valid waiver of
a constitutional right.'5 3 Two federal district court decisions have ex-
151. In January, 1973, Secretary of Defense Laird directed the military depart-
ments to revise their procedures for nonjudicial punishment
to require: a. The availability of adequate legal advice to an accused person
prior to action by Commanders authorized to impose punishment; b. The
opportunity for full presentation by an accused person of his case in the
presence of his or her Commander, to include but not limited to the right to
call witnesses, present evidence and to be accompanied by a person to speak
on his or her behalf .... Memorandum from Laird, supra note 75.
The memorandum does not contain the qualifying exception for "situations when the
exigencies of the service limit the availability of counsel," a reservation which appears
in the Task Force Report. See note 149 supra. If the Laird memorandum intended
to preclude such an exception, then its impact on procedures for nonjudicial punish-
ment would be especially great, since far-flung vessels and outposts might lack attorneys
to provide the accused person with the desired legal advice.
152. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
153. For discussion of waiver of counsel, see Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708
(1948); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Among the important matters for which an accused might need legal advice before
deciding whether to object to trial by summary court-martial are these: (1) convic-
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pressly adopted the latter rationale in holding that the Argersinger right-
to-counsel requirements apply with full force to summary courts-
martial.15 4  Moreover, a number of rulings by the Army's Judge Advo-
cate General lend further support to this trend.'55 These developments
may lead to the demise of the summary court-martial-which to many
would not seem an undesirable eventuality.
156
tion by a summary court-martial is a conviction by a federal court for various purposes;
(2) convictions by a summary court-martial can be considered in subsequent trials for
purposes of permissible additional punishments, MANuAL I 127c, § B; (3) conviction
by a summary court-martial may be used at some later time to impeach the credibility
of the person convicted, id. 1 153b(2)(b); (4) convictions by summary court, like
other convictions, may be utilized as a basis for unfavorable administrative discharge
action; (5) military defense counsel normally will not be provided to the accused to
aid in his defense before a summary court; (6) if, however, he objects to trial by
summary court-martial, the case may be referred to a special or general court-martial
where the accused may receive a more severe sentence (see note 41 supra).
154. Henry v. Warner, 41 U.S.L.W. 2598 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 1973); Daigle v.
Warner, 348 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Hawaii 1972). The Henry and Daigle courts re-
jected outright the Government's contention that the accused's right to opt for a gen-
eral or special court-martial, both of which provide the right to counsel, was sufficient
to meet the requirement of Argersinger. To so hold, in light of the more severe
punishments imposable by the general and special courts-martial, would punish the
accused "for the exercise of one's constitutional rights." Henry v. Warner, 41 U.S.L.W.
2598 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 1973), citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-83
(1968); Daigle v. Warner, 348 F. Supp. 1074, 1080 (D. Hawaii 1972), citing United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. S70, 582-83 (1968).
155. In four summary court-martial cases, the Judge Advocate General of the
Army has set aside the confinement portion of the sentence since the accused were
neither represented by lawyer counsel at trial nor did the accused knowingly and
intelligently waive their right to representation by lawyer counsel. 72-14 JUDGE Aovo-
cATh LEGAL SERVICE § 111(3) (DA Pam. 1972). It could be argued, consistent with
the Argersinger ruling, that the right to counsel only applies to a summary court-
martial in instances where a sentence to confinement is imposed, regardless of the
summary court's jurisdiction to impose confinement. This position would contrast with
that taken in those cases which draw a dividing line between petty offenses and other
crimes for purposes of trial by jury and grand jury indictment. There the test has
generally been the punishment that could be imposed, rather than that which is imposed.
Cases cited note 88 supra. However, the convening authority's election to refer the
case for trial by summary court-martial without providing the accused a military de-
fense attorney might be considered equivalent to a direction by the convening au-
thority that no confinement be imposed by the summary court. A similar problem
of constitutional right to counsel exists with respect to nonjudicial punishment which,
for enlisted personnel "attached to or embarked in a vessel," may include "confinement
on bread and water or diminished rations for not more than seven consecutive days,"
or for enlisted personnel generally, "correctional custody for not more than seven
consecutive days." U.C.M.J. art. 15(b)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b)(2) (1970). Since
"correctional custody" differd from "confinement" in some respects, see MAxuAL
f 131c(4), (5), is correctional custody subject to the Argersinger principle?
156. The Secretary of Defense directive requiring "adequate legal advice" prior to
the imposition of nonjudicial punishment would seem to obviate even further the need
for the summary court-martial, in that it would encourage more personnel to accept
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Civilian courts require some claim or assertion of indigency
on the part of a defendant who wishes to have counsel assigned to
represent him. In courts-martial, however, military counsel will be ap-
pointed where otherwise required, regardless of the wealth of the ac-
cused. Of course, if the accused wishes representation by civilian
counsel he must pay for this from his own pocket.
157
The availability of military defense counsel does not end with the
trial. If the sentence includes a dishonorable or bad conduct discharge
or confinement for as much as one year, qualified appellate defense
counsel is provided to assist the accused' 58-again without any require-
ment that the accused assert his indigency. Moreover, the defend-
ant and his counsel are furnished a verbatim transcript of the trial.
Although the military lawyer who represented the accused at trial
would normally not serve as his appellate defense counsel, this would
create no real disadvantage since the appeal is on the record.
Generally, military defense attorneys are not allowed to repre-
sent their military clients in a collateral attack on a court-martial ac-
tion in a federal district court or in the Court of Claims.15 9 However,
they may participate in the collateral attacks permitted within the sys-
tem of military justice; and these military remedies normally must be
exhausted before resort to the civilian courts.1 60 Indeed, the requirement
of exhaustion of the broad array of military remedies available will usu-
ally render innocuous the inabilility of military defense counsel to
seek relief in the civilian courts.
Since the enactment of the Military Justice Act of 1968, the real
issue concerning right to counsel in military justice is not the availabil-
ity of military defense counsel but their skill and independence. Be-
cause of difficulties encountered by the armed services in retaining
nonjudicial punishment rather than to opt for a summary or special court-martial,
See note 151 supra.
157. I DquAL I 48a. The Task Force recommends that "[i]n view of the critical
need for more minority lawyers, the feasibility of contracting for a pool of minority
civilian defense counsel from which the military could draw, as needed, be explored."
TAs K FoRcE REPORT 125.
158. U.C.MJ. arts. 66(b), 70(c), 10 U.S.C. §§ 866(b), 870(c) (1970); see MANIUAL,
48k(3).
159. The Court of Military Appeals has refused to order the armed services to
allow military defense counsel to participate in collateral attacks in the civil courts.
Johnson v. Judge Advocate General, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 520, 45 C.M.R. 294 (1972).
However, there have been legislative proposals to remove restrictions on such activity
by military lawyers. See, e.g., Bayh, supra note 10, at 19; Sherman, supra note 10,
at 47.
160. For commentary on exhaustion of remedies, see articles cited note 9 supra.
See also Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969).
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judge advocates, it often occurs that young and relatively inexperi-
enced lawyers are assigned to defend serious cases. However, the mil-
itary attorney assigned to prosecute will often have no more, or
perhaps even less, experience, thus diminishing the potential inequi-
ties. Furthermore, the armed services have established excellent le-
gal education programs to inform their lawyers concerning current de-
velopments in criminal law and procedure. Whatever inadequacies
the military system may have in this regard, it is apparent that the
same defects may be found in the civilian courts, where young and in-
experienced counsel are likewise commonly assigned to defend serious
criminal cases.
It has been suggested that some military defense counsel are in-
hibited by a fear that successful representation of the accused will harm
their own military careers and result in poor assignments. The Mili-
tary Justice Act of 1968 amended article 37 of the Code in a manner
designed to prevent such a fear by prohibiting reporting officers from
basing negative fitness reports upon defense counsel's zeal in defend-
ing his client.161 More importantly, the Secretary of Defense has re-
cently directed the armed services to take positive steps towards plac-
ing defense counsel under the authority of the Judge Advocate General,
a step which would go a long way towards eliminating prejudicial com-
mand influence.
162
The Air Force has already instituted a pilot project wherein cer-
tain military lawyers are removed from the authority of a commander
161. See U.C.MJ. art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1970). The Code now provides that
in the preparation of any report or document which may be used in determining
promotions, assignments, or retention on duty, no one preparing the report may "give
a less favorable rating or evaluation of any member of the armed forces because of
the zeal with which such member, as counsel, represented any accused before a court-
martial." Id. art. 37(b)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 837(b)(2). Despite these statutory safe-
guards for defense counsel, the Report of the Task Force on the Administration of
Military Tustice in the Armed Forces found:
Many enlisted men voiced a lack of confidence in military defense counsel.
They believe that defense counsel are not truly representing the interests of the
accused, but rather are serving the commander. The Task Force found that
there were many dedicated, able and enthusiastic judge advocate defense coun-
sel who defend their clients to the utmost of their ability; yet this perception
of duplicity exists. TASK FoRCa REPORT 81-82.
In light of this finding, the Task Force recommended that, "[a]ll judge advocate
defense counsel be placed under the direction of the appropriate Judge Advocate Gen-
eral . . . ." Id. at 124-25.
162. On January 11, 1973, Secretary Laird directed the secretaries of the military
departments "to submit plans to revise the structure of the Judge Advocate organiza-
tions to place defense counsel under the authority of the Judge Advocate General




in the field. This arrangement is designed to provide the same type
of independence enjoyed by military judges in the Trial Judiciary. How-
ever, it is undeniable that even if placed outside the command of any
officer who convenes courts-martial, defense counsel will still be de-
pendent on superior officers within the armed services for promotion,
assignments, and, if they desire it, retention on duty; and there is al-
ways the possibility that the defense lawyer will act less vigorously for
an accused because he fears some form of retaliation.
To put the comparison with civilian justice in perspective, it
should be recalled that defense counsel in civilian courts are not im-
mune from various types of temptations and pressures. The lawyer
representing an unpopular client may fear loss of his practice. Or he
may be inclined to plead a client guilty after minimum investigation of
the case in order to collect a fee and get back to his office. More-
over, if the military accused is concerned about the independence and
enthusiasm of his appointed defense counsel, he may ask that a mili-
tary defense counsel be assigned to represent him from another com-
mand--or even from another armed service. Alternatively, if he has
adequate funds he may obtain civilian counsel.
Trial by Jury
The sixth amendment guarantees trial by an impartial jury; but
more than a century ago the Supreme Court indicated that this guar-
antee, like that of grand jury indictment, did not apply to cases arising
in the armed forces.' 3  While there have been recent attacks on
this conclusion and arguments that, apart from sixth amendment pro-
tections, the method of selecting the members of a court-martial de-
prives the accused of due process, 16 4 to hold unconstitutional the pres-
ently existing procedures for selecting court-martial members would
constitute a startling and belated break with precedent.' 6
Currently the members of general and special courts-martial are
appointed by the convening authority-the military commander who
convenes the court. If the accused is an officer, all the members of
the court-martial will be officers, usually of higher rank than the ac-
163. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123, 138 (1866). Cf. Dynes v.
Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
164. See Remcho, Military Juries: Constitutional Analysis and the Need for Re-
form, 47 IND. L.J. 193 (1972).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Kemp, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 152, 46 C.M.R. 152 (1973),
holding that courts-martial are not part of the judiciary within the meaning of article
III of the Constitution and that therefore any sixth amendment requirements with re-
gard to jury selection have no application to the selection of court-martial members.
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cused. If the accused is an enlisted man, the court members will be of-
ficers unless the accused has made a written request prior to trial that
at least one third of the members be enlisted persons. 166 The conven-
ing authority is enjoined by the Uniform Code to appoint such per-
sons as, in his opinion, "are best qualified for the duty by reason of age,
education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temper-
ament."'1 7 A general court-martial must have at least five members at
all times, and a special court-martial, three members. However, no
ceiling applies to the number of court members. Unless the accused
elects to be tried solely by a military judge, both findings and sentence
are determined by the court members. Conviction requires a two-
thirds written vote of the members present at the time the vote is
taken.' 18 Sentences also require a two-thirds vote, except that sentences
to confinement for more than ten years require a three-fourths vote
and death sentences necessitate a unanimous vote. 6 9
Federal courts have traditionally used twelve-member juries in
criminal cases and have required a unanimous verdict. Perhaps be-
cause of the well established federal procedure, it was long assumed
by many that article III and the sixth amendment made necessary a
jury of this size and a unanimous verdict. But in interpreting the
guarantee of trial by jury, as incorporated in the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court has now made clear
166. U.C.M.. art. 25(c)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 825(c)(1) (1970). The written request
for enlisted members must be personally signed by the accused. United States v.
White, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 583, 45 C.M.R. 357 (1972).
167. U.C.M.J. art. 25(d)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1970). Many commanders
have relied on this provision in appointing only senior noncommissioned officers to
those courts-martial where the accused requested enlisted membership, and this practice
has received judicial approval. United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35
C.M.R. 3 (1964). However, in a later case the Court of Military Appeals disap-
proved the composition of a court-martial whose members were all of the rank of
lieutenant colonel or above. United States v. Greene, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 232, 43 C.M.R. 72
(1970). More recently, the Court has upheld the practice whereby a convening au-
thority delegates to his subordinate commanders the task of selecting prospective
court-martial members whom he ultimately appoints to a particular court-martial.
United States v. Kemp, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 152, 46 C.M.R. 152 (1973).
168. U.C.MJ. art. 52(a)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(2) (1970). However, for con-
viction of an offense for which the death penalty is mandatory, a unanimous vote is
required. Id. art. 52(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(1). Only article 106 of the Code,
id. art. 106, 10 U.S.C. § 906, which punishes spies, provides for a mandatory death
sentence; and so as a practical matter, courts-martial determine guilt on a two-thirds
vote. The voting on findings and sentence are by secret written ballot. Id. art. 51(a),
10 U.S.C § 851(a). Under article 51(c) the presumption of innocence and reason-
able doubt apply to the vote on the findings. Id. art. 51(c), 10 U.S.C. § 851(c).
Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which establishes that due process includes
a requirement of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding.
169. U.C.M.J. art. 52(b), 10 U.S.C. § 852(b) (1970).
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that the Constitution does not include these elements in trial by jury."0°
Thus, courts-martial-with their less than unanimous verdicts and
their membership usually considerably less than twelve-are less at
odds with trial by jury than was once supposed.
Neither in state nor in federal criminal trials is trial by jury consti-
tutionally required for "petty offenses"--those offenses for which the




Since a special court-martial may not adjudge more than six months'
confinement,1 72 its jurisdiction might in one sense seem limited to
petty offenses. However, since special courts-martial can also adjudge
as punishment a bad conduct discharge,7 3 which imposes considerable
stigma on the recipient, it seems more appropriate to conclude that
special court-martial jurisdiction does go beyond trial of petty offenses.
Consequently, to the extent that the constitutional provisions requiring
trial by jury may be held to bear any applicability to military cases,
they should govern special as well as general courts-martial.
Over the years trial by jury has come to include a requirement
that the jury contain a representative cross section of the commu-
nity.' 74  The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 17 was intended by
Congress to bring federal juries closer to this standard. However, more
recently the Supreme Court has upheld the right of the states to set
their own requirements of intelligence, good reputation, and the like
for jury service."Y6 The Uniform Code's standards for appointment to
170. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (due process does not require unani-
mous verdict in state court cases); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (six-
member juries are permissible in state courts). Because of the division of views among
the Justices in Apodaca, the Court apparently would be unwilling to dispense with the
unanimity requirement for federal juries. Justice Brennan's dissent notes the anom-
aly that results when the Court purports to be applying the same requirement of trial
by jury to federal and state courts but insists that only federal courts demand a unani-
mous verdict. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 395 (1972) (dissenting opinion
for Johnson and Apodaca).
171. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Frank v. United States, 395
U.S. 147 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
172. U.C.M.J. art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1970).
173. Id. The Court of Military Appeals has stated: "Considering the consequences
of a bad conduct discharge, we entertain no doubt that confinement at hard labor for
six months and a forfeiture of pay for a like period is a less severe penalty." United
States v. Brown, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 333, 336, 32 C.M.R. 333, 336 (1962).
174. See Remcho, supra note 164, at 208.
175. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq. (1970).
176. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970). Cf. Turner v. Fouche, 396
U.S. 346 (1970). The Supreme Court has also allowed considerable leeway to the
states in providing for peremptory challenges. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965). In courts-martial each accused and the trial counsel-i.e., the Government-
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membership on a court-marital seem consistent with the criteria for jury
selection which have been upheld as constitutional. Of course, the mil-
itary procedure, with its requirement that officers constitute at least
two thirds of the court-martial, is the antithesis of random selection;
the convening authority is enjoined to select the court members on the
basis of qualifications that would not conduce to representativeness.
It is in this aspect that the composition of the court-martial might be
deemed most vulnerable to constitutional attack.
In addition to their unrepresentativeness, courts-martial are sub-
ject to the complaint that their members are subject to the control or in-
fluence of the convening authority-the military commander who
appointed them to the court. Indeed, that commander might have se-
lected for membership the very persons whom he believed he could
influence. By strengthening prohibitions against command influence,
such as the insulation of performance on a court-martial from adverse
comments in fitness reports, Congress sought in the Military Justice
Act of 1968 to lessen these dangers. 177  Additionally, the Act granted
an accused the right, with the military judge's consent, to waive trial
by jury and be tried by the judge alone;178 and, unlike in federal dis-
trict courts, 79 this waiver does not require the approval of the Gov-
ermnent.
The widespread use of waiver of jury by military accused may
have one or more of these explanations: (a) distrust of military juries
on the part of the accused and a corresponding willingness to gamble
on a fairer trial by a military judge alone; (b) belief by the accused
are entitled to one peremptory challenge. U.C.Mi. art. 41(b), 10 U.S.C. § 841(b)
(1970). The Task Force recommends that "[a]dditional peremptory challenges to
the court members be permitted by both prosecution and defense, with the defense
having a greater number than the prosecution." TASK FoncE REPORT 125. The Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that in capital cases each side is entitled to
twenty peremptory challenges; in felony cases, the Government is entitled to six per-
emptory challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly, to ten; in misdemeanor
cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. FaD. R. CluM. P. 24(b).
177. Article 37 of the Uniform Code was amended to deal with some of the possible
abuses that had been unveiled by legislative hearings and judicial opinions. Act of
Oct. 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, § 2, 82 Stat. 1338, amending 10 U.S.C. § 837
(1958) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1970)).
178. U.C.MJ. art. 16(1)(B), (2)(C), 10 U.S.C. H9 816(1)(B), (2)(C). The re-
quest for trial by military judge alone must be made before the court is assembled but
after consultation with defense counsel; and the accused must know the identity of the
military judge. Id.
179. Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires "approval of
the court and the consent of the government." FED. R. CnrM. P. 23(a). The re-
quirement for Government consent was upheld in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S.
24 (1965).
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that, in order to have sentence passed by the military judge,180 it is
worthwhile to waive the right to fact-finding by a military jury; or
(c) a reputation for leniency or defense sympathies on the part of the
military judge who has been assigned to the case.181 Whatever its ex-
planation, the waiver of trial by the full court-martial, combined with
enhanced independence, experience, and confidence on the part of mil-
itary judges, has tended to lessen in the military some of the dangers
against which the guarantee of jury trial helps protect defendants in
the civilian courts.8s2
Independence of the Judge
By providing life tenure for federal judges,18 3 the Constitution
sought to assure their independence. Courts-martial have been criti-
cized because they do not provide the accused a similar protection of
trial before an independent judge. The Military Justice Act of 1968,
building upon an innovation of the armed services, transformed the po-
sition of "law officer" into that of "military judge." It also required
180. Military law currently makes no provision for waiver of sentencing by the
court-martial members in cases where they determine guilt or innocence. However,
the Court of Military Appeals and the Judge Advocates General are considering pro-
posals to transfer sentencing power to the military judge in all cases not involving the
death penalty. See 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 2. The Report of the Task Force also
recommends that military judges be empowered to adjudge the sentence in every non-
capital case where there is a finding of guilty and also to suspend the execution of
sentences they impose. TAsK FoRcE REPORT 124.
181. Since he is aware of the identity of the military judge who will try his case,
the accused is in a position, with his defense counsel's aid, to evaluate intelligently
the probabilities that he might obtain better results by waiving trial by jury. In fact,
the percentage of waivers has been quite great. See note 34 supra. It may be dis-
puted whether this circumstance amounts to a vote of confidence in military judges or
simply a vote of no confidence in military juries. Perhaps some military judges have
tended towards leniency in order to encourage waiver of jury trials, with the resultant
saving of time for prospective court-martial members.
182. According to the Supremej Court:
The purpose of the jury trial, as we noted in Duncan, is to prevent oppression
by the Government. . . . Given this purpose, the essential feature of a jury
obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of
the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community
participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's deter-
mination of guilt or innocence. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
In light of the American tradition of independence for members of the judiciary, it
seems plausible that military judges would form a firmer bastion for accused persons
against oppression and injustice at the hand of military commanders than would be
provided by the military personnel typically detailed to serve as court-martial mem-
bers. Of course, trial by military judge alone does not induce a sense of "community
participation and shared responsibility"--and all the less so if the military judge
comes from some distant post to try the case.
183. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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that the military judges assigned to conduct general courts-martial
be insulated from the control of convening authorities or other mili-
tary commanders in the field.'
In several respects, however, the military judge still lacks some of
the authority possessed by his civilian counterpart. In some instances
he can be overruled by a convening authority. 8 5 He does not have the
authority to grant extraordinary judicial relief pursuant to the All
Writs Act.'86  He has no regular term of office. Of special impor-
tance, he does not participate in sentencing unless an accused has com-
pletely waived trial by jury.187  Despite these limitations, the military
judiciary is acquiring enhanced independence and importance; and its
scope of authority is being expanded apace. Thus, the Air Force re-
cently announced that it will provide full-time military judges for many
of its special courts-martial. 8 The Army is using military judges as
magistrates to authorize release from pretrial confinement and to rule
on applications for permission to search and seize.' 89 It seems inevit-
able that Congress and the armed services will continue to expand the
role of military judges and to use them as a protection against abuses
that might otherwise accompany the absence of jury trial in military jus-
tice.
Speedy Trial
In civilian courts trial must be speedy;9 0 this same right is rec-
ognized by the Uniform Code' 91 and has been upheld by the Court of
Military Appeals.' 9" Thus, in dealing with pretrial restraint of the de-
fendant, the Code commands that "immediate steps shall be taken to
inform him of the specific wrong of which he is accused and to try him
184. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 444, 56 C.M.R. 218 (1972);
Priest v. Koch, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 41 C.M.R. 293 (1970).
186. While there have been holdings that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1970), applies to the Court of Military Appeals and the Courts of Military Review,
military judges probably do not fall within the Act. There are legislative proposals to
authorize military judges to issue all writs appropriate to the exercise of their jurisdic-
tion. See Bayh, supra note 10, at 16.
187. There is no procedure currently available for waiving trial by jury solely with
respect to sentencing. However, without regard to waiver, sentencing power may ulti-
mately be transferred to military judges in all but capital cases. See note 180 supra.
188. See note 70 supra.
189. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
190. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
191. See, e.g., U.C.MJ. arts. 10, 33, 98, 10 U.S.C. §§ 810, 833, 898 (1970).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 37 C.M.R. 209
(1967). The burden of proof rests on the government to justify delay in forwarding
charges. United States v. Mason, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 45 C.M.R. 163 (1972).
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or to dismiss the charges and release him."19s Furthermore, it is a
crime for military personnel to be "responsible for unnecessary delay
in the disposition of any case of a person accused of an offense under
this code."' 94
To enforce the serviceman's right to speedy trial, the armed ser-
ices have required specific justification for noncompliance with pre-
scribed standards for processing military prosecutions. In the Air
Force, for example, these standards now allow eighteen days from ini-
tiation of pretrial restraint to the end of trial by special court-martial,
and forty-five days from date of pretrial restraint to end of a trial by
general court-martial.' 9" These requirements of prompt processing
certainly contrast with the malady of delay and congestion that has
afflicted many civilian courts.' 90
Public Trial
Under the sixth amendment, a trial must be public as well as
speedy. The right to public trial is recognized by the Manual for Courts-
Martial'97 and by the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals. 198
Apparently the court would apply to this right the same exceptions as
those approved by civilian precedents. 99 Of course, the activities of the
military establishment are such that a court-martial is more likely than
193. U.C.M.J. art. 10, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (1970).
194. Id. art. 98, 10 U.S.C. § 898.
195. Court-Martial Processing Standards, U.S. Air Force Judiciary Special Subject
Letter No. 37, Nov. 21, 1972. The Air Force guidelines provide that for all courts-
martial only three days should elapse between the accused's being restricted, arrested, or
confined by military authorities and the preferring of charges. Id. Delays in ex-
cess of these standards must be explained on a chronology sheet for the court-martial.
196. See, e.g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) (conviction was vacated for
inexcusable and prejudicial delay where more than seven years passed between offense
and trial); King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (twenty-week delay
with repeated continuances does not violate the right to a speedy trial); People v.
Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 267 N.E.2d 263, 318 N.Y.S.2d 484, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 924
(1971) (trial some sixteen months after indictment does not violate the right to a
speedy trial).
197. MANuAL 53e.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41 (1956).
199. Some of the applicable precedents are cited in United States v. Brown, 7
U.S.C.M.A. 251, 256, 22 C.M.R. 41, 46 (1956). The Task Force Report proposed
to extend the right of a public trial to nonjudicial punishment; it recommends that
"[a]l1 Article 15 hearings be open to spectators, except where security interests dic-
tate otherwise, but that the individual have the right to confer privately with the
commanders imposing punishment, to relate matters of a personal nature." TAsK
FoRCe REPORT 121. Former Defense Secretary Laird required that "nonjudicial pun-
ishment proceedings be opened to the public when requested by an accused except in
those instances where military exigencies or security interests preclude public dis-
closure." Memorandum from Laird, supra note 75.
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a civilian court to have occasion to exclude spectators from a trial in
order to avoid disclosure of classified information. Also, because of
some resemblances that the article 32 pretrial investigation bears to a
grand jury inquiry, the issue has arisen whether such an investigation
may be cloaked in the same secrecy which is traditional for grand
juries. There is nothing in the Manual for Courts-Martial or in the Uni-
form Code which clearly indicates that it may not be so held.
Venue
Both the sixth amendment and article III of the Constitution con-
template that trial shall take place in the state and district where the
crime was allegedly committed; and if the offense was not committed
within any state, then trial is to be at such place as Congress shall have
directed. 00 In some instances the venue requirement is unclear
because of uncertainty about the place where the crime was com-
mitted.
201
Many offenses committed by servicemen take place far outside
the United States and so, if tried by a federal district court, would be
subject to trial in such place or places as Congress might prescribe. How-
ever, with respect to neither offenses committed within nor those com-
mitted outside the United States has Congress or the President sought
to direct where a trial by court-martial should be held. Thus, such
trial may occur, and sometimes does occur, quite far from the place
where the alleged crime was committed. For example, a serviceman
may become absent without leave at one military post and be prose-
cuted for his absence at some quite different installation, where he
has returned to military custody. Although it does not recognize the
right to a particular venue, the Manual for Courts-Martial does, under
very limited conditions amounting to severe prejudice, authorize a
motion for change of venue.
202
Notice to the Accused
Another sixth amendment right is that of the accused "to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation." The notice re-
200. U.S. CONSr. art. m, § 2; id. amend. VI; 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1970); FED. R.
CluM. P. 18, 20-22.
201. See generally Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961); Johnston v. United
States, 351 U.S. 215 (1956); United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944).
202. The Manual for Courts-Martial provides for change of venue if "the accused
demonstrates that there exists at the place of trial where the prosecution is pending
so great a general atmosphere of prejudice against him that he cannot obtain a fair and
impartial trial in that place .... ." MA uAL I 69e. See generally Chenoweth v. Van
Arsdall, 22 U.S.CM.A. 183, 46 C.M.R. 183 (1973).
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quired by the amendment is generally viewed as relating to charges
that are being preferred, rather than notice of conduct which is crimi-
nal. In view of the form indictments used in many jurisdictions, the
unwillingness of some prosecutors to provide bills of particulars, the
limitations on criminal discovery, and the secrecy of grand jury pro-
ceedings, civilian courts often seem to provide only a bare minimum of
notice to an accused of the misconduct with which he is charged. Con-
versely, military justice provides notable safeguards in this area. The
article 32 pretrial investigation required in serious cases-that is, any
case referred to a general court-martial--provides the defendant with
detailed knowledge about the charge against him and about the Govern-
ment's evidence. Furthermore, with limited exceptions for classified
information, the statements available to the military prosecutor are
made available to the defense as well.
203
There is also a constitutional requirement, grounded on the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, that persons
be given notice of conduct which is prohibited: 20 4 laws which do
not adequately inform citizens of the standards with which they must
comply are unconstitutionally vague.20 5 In this regard, military jus-
tice receives much lower marks.
Widespread criticism has been heaped upon articles 133 and 134
of the Uniform Code for their vagueness and overbreadth. 20° Article
133 prohibits "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.
'20 7
Article 134, generally applicable to enlisted personnel and officers, pro-
hibits "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and dis-
cipline in the armed forces" and "all conduct of a nature to bring dis-
credit upon the armed forces. 208  Criticism of these articles re-
203. ML uAL 44h.
204. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
205. See, e.g., Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Connally v. Gen-
eral Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
206. See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1969); Everett, Article
134, Uniform Code of Military Justice-A Study in Vagueness, 37 N.C.L. REv. 142
(1959); Gaynor, Prejudicial and Discreditable Military Conduct: A Critical Ap-
praisal of the General Article, 22 HAST. L.J. 259 (1971). But see Wiener, Are the
General Military Articles Unconstitutionally Vague? 54 A.B.A.J. 357 (1968).
The 1971 Annual Report of the Court of Military Appeals and the Judge Advo-
cates General proposed that Congress consider legislation to
restrict the scope of Article 134 by enacting separate punitive articles of the
code covering selected offenses now dealt with by Article 134, and by limiting
the maximum punishment for other conduct prejudicial to good order and
discipline or service-discrediting conduct to confinement and forfeitures for
6 months. 1971 ANNuAL REPORT 1, 2.
207. U.C.M.J. art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970).
208. Id. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934.
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cently ripened into judicial action in Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy,20 9
where the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held article 134 unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on
fifth amendment due process grounds. Less than a month after the
Avrech decision was handed down, its rationale was reinforced and
expanded by the Third Circuit in Levy v. Parker,21 0 where article 133,
as well as article 134, was held unconstitutionally vague on its face. In
so holding, the court emphasized that the "all-encompassing quality"
of the two provisions infused them with a "real capacity for arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement." '' Read together, the Avrech and
Levy decisions strongly remind the Government that "civilian standards
of specificity" do apply to the military in defining prohibited con-
duct.21a
Discovery
Related to notice of the accusation against him is the defendant's
right to discovery of the Government's case against him. In both fed-
eral and state criminal trials, an accused clearly has some constitu-
tional claim to know of certain vital information in the hands of the
prosecutor.21 3  Furthermore, in federal trials the accused is entitled to
the benefits of the Jencks Act.214
Military justice goes far beyond any constitutional rights that might
exist in the area of criminal discovery. Generally, the Manual for
Courts-Martial requires that trial counsel-the prosecutor-permit the
defense to examine "any paper accompanying the charges, including
the report of investigation . . ." and that he "advise the defense of the
probable witnesses to be called by the prosecution . *.. ."21 Fur-
thermore, defense counsel cannot be -prevented from interviewing
209. 41 U.S.L.W. 2497 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 1973).
210. 41 U.S.L.W. 2597 (3d Cir. Apr. 18, 1973).
211. Id. With respect to article 133, which prohibits "conduct unbecoming an offi-
cer and a gentleman," the court in Levy observed: "In a society witnessing rapidly
changing manners and mores, against what existing standard is gentlemanly conduct
to be measured?" Id.
212. Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 41 U.S.L.W. 2497, 2498 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20,
1973).
213. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases
-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DuE LI. 477.
214. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). The Act, inter alia, allows defendants in federal
criminal prosecutions to have access to any statements made by a Government wit-
ness relating to the subject matter about which such witness has already testified on
direct examination at trial.
215. MANUAL I 44h.
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prospective Government witnesses.21 6 Although the Jencks Act ap-
plies to courts-martial, 21" the broad rules of discovery prescribed by the
Manual leave few occasions for invoking the provisions of that Act.
Discovery in criminal cases is sometimes sought by the prosecu-
tion; and in such instances the defendant's privilege against self-in-
crimination may be urged in opposition to granting such discovery.
In upholding a Florida requirement that a defendant give notice of an
alibi defense as a condition to introducing evidence in support of that
defense, the Supreme Court seems to have affirmed the prosecution's
right to discovery.21 Similarly, the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure authorize some discovery for thei Government. 219 Contrari-
wise, military justice does not currently provide for any discovery on
behalf of the prosecution; and there is no requirement that an accused
provide notice that he will defend on the basis of alibi, mental irrespon-
sibility at the time of the offense, or lack of mental capacity to stand
trial. However, if either the convening authority or the trial counsel
foresees that insanity may be a defense, he can arrange for the accused
to be evaluated by a sanity board22-through which means the Gov-
ernment may obtain helpful evidence in resisting the insanity defense.
221
Confrontation
The sixth amendment provides a criminal defendant with the right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him. A landmark prece-
dent affirming the applicability of constitutional rights to military per-
sonnel held that a deposition could not be received in evidence over the
objection of an accused who had not been allowed an opportunity to be
present when the deposition was taken.222 However, the Government
still may use at trial the deposition of a witness who has become un-
available, if the accused and his counsel were present when the depo-
sition was taken. Furthermore, courts-martial, like civilian courts, are
allowed to receive the former testimony of an absent witness given at
a prior trial of the accused "in which the issues were substantially the
216. Id. f J 42c, 44h.
217. United States v. Albo, 22 U.S.CM.A. 30, 46 C.M.R. 30 (1972).
218. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
219. FaD. R. Cmx. P. 16(c). The Government's right to discovery is conditioned
upon discovery's being granted to the defendant under Rule 16; thus, to avoid discovery
by the Government, the defendant may be forced to relinquish his own right of dis-
covery.
220. MAruAL f 121.
221. See, e.g., United States v. Babbidge, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 327, 40 C.M.R. 39 (1969).
222. United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
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same. '223  In such instances, there is preserved not only the opportu-
nity for cross-examination-which probably is the core of the right of
confrontation-but also the presence of the accused when the witness
gives his testimony.
Like the right of confrontation, the common law hearsay rule
embodies a policy against receiving in evidence the statements of a
person who is not present in court for cross-examination. Of course,
the hearsay rule can work to exclude defense evidence as well as that
offered by the prosecution, while the constitutional right of confronta-
tion belongs solely to the defendant. The Manual for Courts-Martial
applies the hearsay prohibition to courts-martial and also recognizes
various exceptions thereto-many of them familiar to civilian jurispru-
dence.224 These exceptions often have the practical effect of diminish-
ing the scope of the right of confrontation.
Of special importance to courts-martial are the hearsay excep-
tions for official records 2'5 and business entries.22 6  Indeed, because
of these exceptions the Government evidence in some cases--especially
those involving unauthorized absence or desertion-is exclusively or
chiefly documentary. Furthermore, since the military establishment
prescribes the rules which govern the preparation of official records
and the information to be contained therein, military authorities to some
extent may determine the scope of the official records exception to the
hearsay rule-and thus may, in effect, limit the right of confronta-
tion. 22
7
Generally speaking, however, the military rules of evidence tend
to adhere to the civilian model, and existing disparities are not crucial.
223. MANuAL 145b. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 now makes ex-
press provision for the taking of depositions to preserve testimony and for the use of
the deposition at trial by either party if the witness is unavailable or refuses to testify
concerning the subject of the deposition. 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1970).
224. MANuAL 1 139 (general rule), 140-46 (exceptions).
225. Id. 1 144b. Admissibility of an official record of a fact or event depends on
the existence of an official duty to record that fact or event. See, e.g., United States v.
Kitchen, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 541, 18 C.M.R. 165 (1955); United States v. Bennett, 4
U.S.C.M.A. 309, 15 C.M.R. 309 (1954); United States v. Wilson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 3,
15 C.M.R. 3 (1954).
226. MANuAL 144c.
227. See, e.g., United States v. Simone, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 146, 19 C.M.R. 272 (1955);
United States v. Kitchen, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 541, 18 C.M.R. 165 (1955), where by a change
in record-keeping requirements the Government was able to eliminate certain problems
of proof in desertion cases. In United States v. Wilson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 15 C.M.R. 3
(1954), the Government's case hinged on certain delayed entries which had been made
in official records many months after the events which they recited; but the court




For example, in military justice, as in most civilian courts, a memoran-
dum which is properly shown by a witness to embody his past recollec-
tion recorded is admissible as substantive evidence.22 8  On the other
hand, a prior inconsistent statement is admissible in a military trial for
impeaching purposes but not as substantive evidence of the fact that it
asserts. 229  The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, however,
would allow the prior inconsistent statement in as substantive evi-
dence. 0
Obtaining Witnesses
In civilian courts an accused is entitled "to have compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor."'281  Article 46 of the Uni-
form Code provides that process issued in court-martial cases shall be
similar to that which the federal district courts may issue and shall
run to any part of the United States. 232  Thus, unlike the process of a
state court, the subpoena issued to a witness to appear and testify be-
fore a court-martial is not limited by state boundaries.
A federal grand jury may subpoena witnesses to appear before it;
but the language of articles 46 and 47 of the Uniform Code, which
punish refusal to appear or testify, 33 suggests strongly that compul-
sory process is not available for the defense or the Government during
the pretrial investigation. On the other hand, the Code does author-
ize compulsory process to compel an appearance for the taking of a
deposition.
2 34
Many offenses under the Uniform Code will occur and be tried
outside the United States. In such instances, the appearance of mil-
228. MAuA. 146a. The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence also allow the
admission in evidence of past recollection recorded as an exception to the hearsay
rule. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5).
229. MANuALx 153b(2)(c).
230. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1). The constitutionality of this
view has been upheld in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), over the objection
that the defendant's right of confrontation had been violated.
231. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
232. U.C.MJ. art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1970).
233. Id. arts. 46-47, 10 U.S.C. 8H 846-47. In its reference to the trial counsel, the
defense counsel, and the court-martial, article 46 seems to contemplate charges that
have already been referred for trial by court-martial-an event that would be subse-
quent to any pretrial investigation under article 32. Article 47 refers to a person
subpoenaed "to appear as a witness before a court-martial, military commission, court
of inquiry, or any other military court or board, or before any military or civil officer
designated to take a deposition to be read in evidence before such a court, commis-
sion, or board . . . ." Id. art. 47(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 847(a)(1). There is a con-
spicuous omission of any reference to an officer conducting a pretrial investigation.
234. See id. art. 47, 10 U.S.C. § 847.
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itary witnesses can be obtained by means of military orders. However,
court process will not be available to compel the appearance of foreign
civilian witnesses in behalf of either the Government or the defense,
but the attendance of such witnesses may sometimes be obtained
through the aid of an appropriate foreign government. 235
In the event of disagreement between trial counsel and defense
counsel as to whether a witness' testimony is necessary, the matter is
referred to the convening authority or, if trial has begun, to the mili-
tary judge.230 In such cases, the defense counsel must provide a synop-
sis of the witness' expected testimony and state why the witness' per-
sonal appearance is necessary. 23 Through thQ information re-
quired to support a defense request for a subpoena, the Government
receives some discovery of the defense's case. However, under pre-
vailing doctrine, such discovery does not appear to involve an unconsti-
tutional abridgment of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.238 Moreover, without some requirement that the defendant state
his grounds for requesting issuance of subpoenas, the requests for sub-
poenas might become frivolous. Where a request for a subpoena has
been properly presented and improperly denied, the Court of Military
Appeals has not been reluctant to reverse an ensuing conviction.23 9
Right to Bail
Although the eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required," military justice has never recognized bail as a
means for obtaining release from pretrial or post-trial confinement.
However, this absence of bail seems less important in practice than it
might seem in theory. In this respect, it should be initially noted that
the bail system has proven less than satisfactory in the civilian courts;
many abuses, for instance, have been associated with the activities
of bail bondsmen. Accordingly, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act
of 1966,40 which has provided various alternatives to bail; some
states have followed suit. Secondly, the Uniform Code prohibits indis-
criminate use of pretrial confinement for minor offenses,241 and the
235. See MANuAL f 115d(1); J. SNEE & A. Pyin, supra note 77, at 94-101.
236. MANuAL l15a.
237. Id.
238. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
239. See Everett, The Role of the Deposition in Military Justice, 7 MImrrAnY L.
REv. 131, 137-38 (1960).
240. Act of June 22, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 3146 (1964) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (1970)).
241. The Uniform Code provides that an accused "shall be ordered into arrest or
confinement, as circumstances may require; but when charged only with an offense
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violation of this mandate may itself constitute an offense under the
Code.2 42  Moreover, various military commands have issued direc-
tives intended to diminish pretrial confinement, and confinement im-
posed in violation of these directives is also illegal.243  Third, the em-
phasis in military justice on speedy trial 244 reduces some of the baneful
effects of pretrial confinement.2 4i Fourth, the accused serviceman in
pretrial confinement is apparently still in a pay status, 240 while his ci-
vilian counterpart who awaits trial in a jail often will lose his job and
source of income while trial is pending. Fifth, post-conviction service
of a sentence to confinement may be deferred in the discretion of the
convening authority.247 And sixth, the Court of Military Appeals has
recently recognized a broad new remedy allowing servicemen to con-
test improper pretrial or post-trial confinement.248  Additionally, the
Army's recent program creating "military magistrates," who have au-
thority to release from pretrial confinement, is additional evidence of
the military's desire to reduce pretrial confinement to the barest min-
normally tried by summary court-martial, he shall not ordinarily be placed in con-
finement." U.C.M.J. art. 10, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (1970). Article 13, which prohibits
pretrial punishment, directs that arrest or confinement prior to trial shall not be
"any more rigorous than the circumstances require to insure his presence." Id. art.
13, 10 U.S.C. § 813. Thus, it seems to parallel the strong intimation in Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), that the only permissible purpose of pretrial confinement is
to assure the defendant's presence for trial. The Manual for Courts-Martial may go
further than this when it authorizes pretrial confinement if "deemed necessary to
insure the presence of the accused at the trial or because of the seriousness of the of-
fense charged." MA I -AL. 20c. However, this is still short of preventive detention.
Cf. D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to -1332 (Supp. IV, 1971).
242. U.C.MJ. art. 98(2), 10 U.S.C. § 898(2) (1970).
243. See United States v. Gray, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 615, 620, 20 C.M.R. 331, 336 (1956).
See also 1962 Hearings 847, 873, 908-09, 925, 944, 961.
244. See notes 191-96 supra and accompanying text.
245. In civilian life, a defendant who undergoes lengthy pretrial confinement may
be rendered destitute.
246. Under article 57(a), 10 U.S.C. § 857(a) (1970), forfeitures may apply only to
pay and allowances that become due on or after the date the sentence is approved by
the convening authority. No forfeiture may apply to pay or allowvances accrued before
that date.
247. Id. art. 57(d), 10 U.S.C. § 857(d). If the accused is no longer under the
command of the convening authority, service of the sentence to confinement may be
deferred by the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the command
to which the accused is currently assigned.
248. Article 138, 10 U.S.C. § 938 (complaints of wrongs), is now deemed by the
court to be a proper remedy for contesting illegal pretrial or post-trial confinement.
Dale v. United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 254, 41 C.M.R 254 (1970); Walker v. United
States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 41 C.M.R. 247 (1970). Except as to confinement, the
armed services apparently believe that article 138 does not apply to matters involving
discipline. See Judge Advocate General, Air Force, Opinion 1972/111 (Oct. 17,
1972); Judge Advocate General, Air Force, Opinion 1972/53 (Apr. 26, 1972).
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imum. 249 In view of the frequent accounts of difficulties in the civilian
system in the administration of bail, military justice, in practice, seems
to offer very adequate substitutes for bail.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In addition to providing a right to bail, the eighth amendment
prohibits excessive fines and the infliction of cruel and unusual pun-
ishments. The restrictions on fines imposed by the Manual for Courts-
Martial make them a seldom-used punishment in military justice and
leave little room for them to be excessive.250 The Manual also directs
courts-martial to consider the "ability of the accused to pay" in de-
termining the amount of forfeitures of pay as well as fines.2 ' 1
The Uniform Code contains an express prohibition of cruel or un-
usual punishments, including some specific punishments that were at
one time used by courts-martial and military commissions.2 52  In
United States v. Wappler, this statutory prohibition was held by the
Court of Military Appeals to embrace punishments that might not fall
within the purview of the eighth amendment.253  Reading the Uniform
Code as a whole, the court concluded that Congress intended to pro-
hibit as cruel and unusual punishment confinement on bread and wa-
ter for more than three days and that even the three-day punishment
was limited to those servicemen "attached to or embarked in a ves-
sel."1254  It is doubtful that all civilian courts would infer such broad
protection from the cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Capital punishment traditionally has been part of military justice.
Presumably, a clear decision that capital punishment is cruel and un-
usual would be applied to courts-martial. However, the Supreme Court's
recent ruling in Furman v. Georgia 55 seems to bar only the arbitrary
imposition of capital punishment at a jury's unguided discretion. In
the Uniform Code, capital punishment is mandatory only for spies.
2 56
249. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
250. According to the Manual for Courts-Martial, "[a] fine normally should not
be adjudged against a member of the armed forces unless the accused was unjustly en-
riched as the result of the offense of which he is convicted." MANUAL 126h(3).
Moreover, "[s]pecial and summary courts-martial may not adjudge any fine in excess
of the total amount of forfeitures which may be adjudged in a case." Id.
251. Id. 126h(l).
252. U.C.M.J. art. 55, 10 U.S.C. § 855 (1970). This article prohibits branding,
marking, or tattooing on the body, flogging, and the "use of irons, single or double, ex-
cept for the purpose of safe custody .... "
253. 2 U.S.C.M.A. 393, 9 C.M.R. 23 (1953).
254. Id. at 396, 9 C.M.R. at 26.
255. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
256. See U.C.MJ. art. 106, 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1970).
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For the other offenses where it is authorized by the Code, capital pun-
ishment is only a permissible punishment. 25 7  Accordingly, for those
offenses the power to impose capital punishment seems in doubt-on
the premise, of course, that, where not excluded by the exigencies of the
service, constitutional rights do apply to military personnel.
Appellate Review
In civilian courts the existence of important rights is sometimes
jeopardized by the difficulties and costs of vindicating those rights on
appeal. For example, access to a free transcript of the trial258 and pro-
vision of cost-free counsel for a first appeal as of right259 are predicated
on a demonstration of indigency. Consequently, convicted civilians of
limited means, if above the "indigency" level, may be forced by eco-
nomic considerations to forgo the appellate process, especially if the
conviction is for a relatively minor offense. In view of these consid-
erations, a civilian prosecutor or trial judge may take legally ques-
tionable action secure in the knowledge that the action will never be re-
viewed on appeal.
The corresponding military procedures seem less vulnerable to
such abuse. Initially, military justice provides a verbatim record of
trial to an accused without any showing of indigency on his part.
200
Since review of certain sentences is automatic, the availability of the
trial record does not depend on the accused's filing a notice of appeal or
otherwise demonstrating his intention to appeal. More significantly,
military appellate defense counsel can be used by an accused without
cost and without any requirement of a demonstration of ndigency.
The accused is free, of course, to retain civilian counsel to aid in his
appeal at his own expense.
Military justice provides several levels of broad appellate review.
The convening authority provides the initial review of the law, facts,
and sentence, and possesses an absolute discretion to grant clemency to
the accused.26' In any case where there is a punitive discharge or con-
finement for a year or more, a Court of Military Review must also review
the facts, law, and appropriateness of the sentence. 2 2  Review by
257. E.g., id. arts. 94 (mutiny or sedition), 99 (misbehavior before the enemy),
104 (aiding the enemy), 10 U.S.C. §§ 894, 899, 904 (1970).
258. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
259. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
260. U.C.MJ. arts. 19, 54, 10 U.S.C. §§ 819, 854 (1970).
261. Id. arts. 60-64, 10 U.S.C. §§ 860-64; see, e.g., United States v. Massey, 5
U.S.C.M.A. 514, 18 C.M.R. 138 (1955).
262. U.C.MJ. art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1970). This review is on the entire record
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the Court of Military Appeals is limited to questions of law. Compul-
sory review of the facts and appropriateness of sentence, virtually un-
known in the civilian setting, constitutes a unique feature of military
justice.203  Finally, additional extraordinary remedies are available to
an accused serviceman in contesting his conviction and sentence where
alleged violation of constitutional rights is involved.
264
PENDING PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Article 67(g) of the Uniform Code requires that the judges of the
Court of Military Appeals, the Judge Advocates General of the armed
forces, and the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation
meet annually to survey the operations of the Code and report thereon
to the congressional Committees on Armed Services, the Secretary of
Defense, and the secretaries of the military departments.2 65  In its report
for 1971, this Code Committee made legislative recommendations that
Congress (1) clarify the authority of military judges, Courts of Military
Review, and the Court of Military Appeals to grant extraordinary relief;
(2) permit earlier execution of a sentence to confinement; (3) remove the
convening authority's responsibility to make a post-trial review of the
court-martial's findings; and (4) restrict the scope of article 134 of the
Code.2 66  The Code Committee will continue to consider other pro-
posals-of which the most significant would probably be granting the
military judge sentencing power in all cases not involving a death
penalty, establishing a system of random selection for court-martial
members, and permitting an appeal directly from the Court of Military
Appeals to the Supreme Court.
Senator Bayh has advocated legislation that would take from mil-
itary commanders many of the responsibilities that they have tradition-
of trial, and this record must be verbatim. Id. arts. 66(b), (c), 10 U.S.C. §§ 866(b),
(c); MANuAL 111 82, 83.
263. The Task Force Report recommends these changes in appellate review: in
other than capital cases, automatic review of all general courts-martial and special
courts-martial in which a bad conduct discharge is approved by the convening authority
should be eliminated, except for a clemency review by the convening authority; in-
stead, the appellate judiciary should review only those cases appealed by the accused;
the accused should have the right to appeal in all special courts-martial; and a verba-
tim record of trial should be prepared in those cases in which the accused indicates an
appeal will be made. TAsK FORCE REPORT 125-26. Apparently the Task Force con-
cluded that the automatic appeal now provided by the Code in serious cases is not
worth the effort, expense, and delay but that for many minor offenses the appellate
review should be expanded.
264. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
265. U.C.MJ. art. 67(g), 10 U.S.C. § 867(g) (1970). The Secretary of Trans-
portation has authority over the Coast Guard.
266. 1971 Aru'uAL REPORT 2.
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ally exercised in appointing court-martial personnel and referring cases
to courts-martial for trial.2 67 Also, the Senator would eliminate the
summary court-martial, transfer sentencing responsibilities to military
judges, authorize random selection for court-martial membership,
and broaden the base of court membership. Appellate review would
be altered and provision made for appeal from the Court of Military
Appeals to the Supreme Court by petitions for certiorari. To screen
cases before trial and reduce pretrial confinement, provision would
be made for an initial appearance and preliminary examination like
that authorized under Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.2 68 Senator Bayh would also provide a statutory basis for an ex-
panded right of discovery in military cases and would authorize mili-
tary defense counsel to seek collateral relief in civil courts.
A proposal by Senator Hatfield would limit military jurisdiction
to certain military offenses and transfer jurisdiction over many other of-
fenses to the federal district courts.26 The Hatfield proposal would
also provide for random selection of court members and would alter the
rules for determining the composition of the courts.
2 70
The Report of the Task Force on the Administration of Military
Justice271 has recommended a broad array of reforms, many of them in
response to complaints of racial discrimination within the system of
military justice. The scope of these recommendations is too broad to
catalogue within the confines of this Article, but it should be noted that
they have already resulted in affirmative action by the Secretary of De-
fense. In response to the Task Force recommendations, the Secretary
has already ordered significant reform of nonjudicial punishment pro-
cedures, as well as the initiation of affirmative action towards isolat-
ing defense counsel more fully from command influence.
27 2
While the Task Force's recommendations are wide-ranging and,
in many respects, significant, they are less than revolutionary. 8  Con-
sequently, their implementation may help the armed services to fore-
stall more sweeping changes should military officials be so inclined.
267. Bayh, supra note 10.
268. FED. R. CumM. P. 5.
269. S. 4178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 821 (1970), reprinted in 116 CoNo. REc. 27,
223 (1970); see Sherman, supra note 10, at 29.
270. S. 4169, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 825 (1970), reprinted in 116 CONG. REc. 27,
220-21 (1970); see Sherman, supra note 10, at 44-46.
271. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
272. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
273. See TAsK FoRcE REPORT 112-27, succinctly stating the specific recommenda-




As a result of the Military Justice Act of 1968, the decisions of the
Court of Military Appeals, and such precedent-shattering cases as
O'Callahan, Avrech, and Levy 274 military justice has taken on a new
look. Even so, there are still cries for further changes. The armed
services plead, however, that the existing system be given a chance to
work before further major legislative changes are made. In justifying
their position, the services point to their own demonstrated willing-
ness to undertake innovations in the administration of military justice
and to existing procedural safeguards, which compare favorably with
those available in many civilian courts.
One suspects that these arguments will be sufficient to prevent ma-
jor legislative changes. However, it is likely that the role of military
judges will be expanded in various ways-for example, by granting
them sentencing power even in cases where the issues of fact are tried
by the military jury,27 by permitting them to suspend sentences or de-
fer confinement, by authorizing them to issue "search warrants" and to
rule on the need for pretrial confinement, and by empowering them to
issue extraordinary relief. Also, the summary court-martial should
soon virtually disappear from the scene. Already the absolute right of
an accused to object to the jurisdiction of this court-martial and the
probable applicability of the Argersinger v. Hamlin276 requirement of
counsel have significantly reduced its utility as an expeditious and sim-
plified tribunal. Moreover, the availability of trial before a military
judge in a special court-martial, as opposed to trial before a nonlegal
officer in the summary procedure, might render the former more desir-
able in some cases even from the standpoint of the accused. The cases
that have been handled by summary courts-martial should be suscepti-
ble to disposition by special courts-martial-especially if there is a de-
cline in the overall court-martial rate and if trial by military jury con-
tinues to be waived in a substantial percentage of cases.
Since disposition of the minor offenses is subject to the fewest pro-
cedural safeguards in both civil courts and military justice,177 there
will probably be increased attention to the procedures used for hand-
ling such offenses. Thus, nonjudicial punishment under article 15 will
be closely supervised by the armed services to prevent discrimination or
274. See notes 49-59, 209-12 supra and accompanying text.
275. This sentencing power for military judges has been recommended by the
Task Force. TASK FORCE REPORT 124.
276. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See notes 152-54 supra and accompanying text.
277. Petty offenses are not subject to the constitutionat requirements of jury
trial or grand jury indictment. See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
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arbitrariness in its imposition.278 However, in this area new legisla-
tion does not seem necessary and solutions to problems should be at-
tainable through administrative action by the services themselves or
by the Department of Defense-such as the Laird Memorandum's insist-
ence on the provision of "adequate legal advice" to the accused before
imposition of nonjudicial punishment. Moreover, the accused's right to
object to nonjudicial punishment provides him with a valuable shield
against unfair treatment.
2 7 9
Plea-bargaining, a much criticized but important feature of military
justice in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, 2 0 has received approval
from the Supreme Court in the civilian setting.28 ' Therefore, no com-
pelling reason exists for its abandonment by the military-especially if
the armed services continue to undergo a shortage of experienced mil-
itary lawyers.
The selection of court-martial members by the convening author-
ity will remain a sore spot. However, this issue should become less im-
portant if there c6ntinues to be extensive waiver of trial by military
jury and if the military judges are granted sentencing power even in
cases where guilt is determined by the court-martial members. Ran-
dom selection of court-martial members has apparently been under-
taken on a limited basis in the field 2 -- although its legality is not
completely clear under the Code's present wording.2 3 However, re-
gardless of the method of selection of court members, there probably
will continue to be claims that, in some way, their rank and relationship
to military commanders influenced their decisions. The high inci-
dence of waiver of trial by full court-martial in favor of trial by mill-
278. See TAsK FORCE REPORT 120-21; Memorandum from Laird, supra note 75.
279. This right exists unless the defendant is attached to or embarked in a vessel.
U.C.M.J. art. 15(a), 10 U.S.C. § 815(a) (1970). This exception, apparently designed to
meet the needs of the Navy, retained for a ship's captain the authority to place a man
in the brig without going through a court-martial. Id. art. 15(b)(2)(A), 10 U.S.C.
§ 815(b) (2) (A). Since many naval vessels do not have qualified legal personnel
assigned to them, it is difficult to imagine how such seagoing commands can possibly
comply with the Secretary of Defense's directive for the provision of "adequate legal
advice" prior to the imposition of nonjudicial punishment or with the recent district
court decisions requiring the availability of counsel in summary courts-martial.
280. The Air Force has continued to frown on plea-bargaining. See note 72 supra.
281. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
282. See Remcho, supra note 164, at 199.
283. See U.C.M.J. art. 25(d)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1970), which seems to
imply that the commander should exercise personal discretion in selecting court-martial
members. But cf. United States v. Kemp, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 152, 46 C.M.R. 152 (1973).
See notes 166-67 supra and accompanying text. Random selection seems to be at the
other pole from conscious selection of the best qualified persons to serve on the court.
[Vol. 1973:649
MILITARY JUSTICE
tary judge seems to testify to the pervasiveness of this feeling among
military personnel. In that respect, military judges, insulated from the
control of commanders in the field and strengthened in their indepen-
dence and objectivity by the judicial ethic, do seem relatively immune
from command influence. Thus, their emergence on the military jus-
tice scene may provide an answer to a persistent complaint.
Finally, the relative success of military justice in avoiding court
congestion and trial delays constitutes an additional impressive argu-
ment against further precipitous changes. Certainly proposals to change
military justice should carry a burden of proof that they will not ma-
terially delay military criminal law administration.
While the new look in military justice does not constitute utopia,2"4
the most compelling needs for change seem already to have been \met.
284. It should be noted that the advent of an all-volunteer army may lead to certain
attitudinal changes in military justice. Perhaps the armed services will be under con-
siderable pressure to continue improvement of military justice so that it will not be
an obstacle to securing enlistments. On the other hand, the courts may become less
protective of an enlistee who has voluntarily subjected himself to military justice than
with respect to inductees who have become part of the military establishment against
their wills. Finally the all-volunteer service may have an entirely different court-
martial rate than that of a military establishment based in part on conscription. For
example, there may be greater selectivity, with the result being a drop in the court-
martial rate and the number of offenses. On the other hand, the all-volunteer army
may produce an ethnic and economic mix in the armed services which is conducive to
greater tension and disorders.
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